Direct Examination: Some Evidentiary and Practical Considerations by Gitchel, W. Dent
University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review 
Volume 9 Issue 2 Article 2 
1986 
Direct Examination: Some Evidentiary and Practical 
Considerations 
W. Dent Gitchel 
Follow this and additional works at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Evidence Commons, and the Litigation Commons 
Recommended Citation 
W. Dent Gitchel, Direct Examination: Some Evidentiary and Practical Considerations, 9 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK 
L. REV. 255 (1987). 
Available at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/lawreview/vol9/iss2/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Bowen Law Repository: Scholarship & Archives. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review by an authorized editor of Bowen 
Law Repository: Scholarship & Archives. For more information, please contact mmserfass@ualr.edu. 




I. SOME PRELIMINARY PRACTICAL CONSIDERA-
T IO N S .......................................... 258
A. Sequencing the Case .......................... 258
B. The Lawyer's Demeanor ....................... 259
1. The lawyer's physical position
2. The lawyer must listen
3. The lawyer must watch the witness
C. The Interrogative Dialogue ..................... 261
II. THE REQUIREMENT TO ASK NONLEADING
Q U ESTIO N S .................................... 263
A . Exceptions ................................... 264
1. The hostile witness
2. The child witness
3. The witness whose recollection is exhausted
4. Preliminary and undisputed matters
B. What is a Leading Question, Anyway? . . . . . . . . . . 268
III. A BASIC OUTLINE FOR DIRECT EXAMINATION 269
A. Introduce the W itness ......................... 269
B. Accredit the W itness ......................... 269
C. Position the Witness in the Action .............. 270
D. Elicit the Witness' Information ................. 270
E . Q uit ........................................ 272
IV. RESPONDING TO OBJECTIONS ................. 272
A. Objections to the Form of the Question .......... 272
B. Objections to Admissibility of the Testimony ..... 273
1. Respond when possible
2. Do not argue with the ruling
3. Make an offer of proof after a sustained objec-
tion
* B.A., Hendrix College, 1963; J.D., University of Arkansas at Fayetteville, 1969. Associate
Professor of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock.
UALR LAW JOURNAL
V. HANDLING AND INTRODUCTION OF EXHIBITS 274
A. The Importance of Making a Record ............ 275
1. Keep a list of exhibits
2. Always refer to each exhibit by number
B. The Requirements for Admissibility ............. 276
C . Stipulations .................................. 278
D. The Method of Laying a Foundation ............ 278
1. Qualify the witness
2. Refer to the marked exhibit
3. Show the exhibit to opposing counsel
4. Ask permission to approach
5. Show the witness the exhibit
6. Ask the necessary foundation questions
7. Offer the exhibit into evidence
8. Examine the witness about the exhibit
9. Publish the exhibit to the jury
E. Some Common Foundation Questions ........... 281
1. Real Evidence
a. What is it?
b. How do you recognize it?
c. Is it in the same condition?
2. Letters
3. Business records
VI. THE PRESENTATION OF EXPERT TESTIMONY. 285
A. The Nature of Opinions ...................... 285
B. The Hypothetical Question .................... 287
C. The Use of Inadmissible Data ................. 288
D. Direct Examination of the Expert ............... 289
1. Establish the expertise
2. Tie the expert to the case
3. Establish the basis for the opinion
4. Ask for the opinion
VII. WHAT TO DO IF THE WITNESS FORGETS ...... 293
A. The Importance of Preparation ................. 293
B. Refreshing Recollection ....................... 294
C. Past Recollection Recorded .................... 296
D. Prior Statements Classified as Nonhearsay ...... 297





Direct examination is the sine qua non of a trial. The lawyer's
other functions during the trial-conducting voir dire, opening state-
ment, cross-examination and closing argument-are undeniably of
great importance, but direct examination is the most basic skill of the
trial lawyer.1
Voir dire, when the lawyer is allowed to conduct it, can set the
tone for the entire trial and affords the lawyer his only opportunity to
converse directly with the jurors. Opening statement can and should
condition the jury to understand the evidence it is about to hear. Clos-
ing argument affords the lawyer the opportunity to suggest to the ju-
rors the inferences they should draw from the evidence they have heard
and tell them why his client should win. Cross-examination serves to
place the testimony of the other side's witnesses in proper perspective.
All these elements of the trial, however, are mere supports for the cen-
tral component of the lawsuit-the presentation of the evidence sup-
porting the lawyer's theory of the case. This evidence, the essence of
the case, must be presented through the direct examination of
witnesses.
Much is written and spoken about the "art" of cross-examination.
Although cross-examination may be more dramatic, it is usually icing
on the cake of the lawsuit. Direct examination, on the other hand,
while perhaps more mundane, must be conducted effectively if one is to
present the case to the client's best advantage.' It is a skill which can
be mastered by any lawyer through adequate preparation and acquired
technique, together with a mastery of the law of evidence.
There is a vast gulf between the classroom and the courtroom. In
the classroom students learn the venerable concepts of the law of evi-
dence and the rules by which they can be applied to factual situations,
but it is impossible to learn how to utilize the law of evidence in a
classroom. It is necessary to learn the law of evidence as an academic
discipline before attempting to prepare and try a lawsuit; but the meta-
morphosis from understanding the abstract principles of evidence law
to mastering the rules of evidence as useable implements with which to
construct a symmetrical case-in-chief must occur in a courtroom. Mere
mastery of evidentiary principles without the ability to apply them in
1. See J. TANFORD, THE TRIAL PROCESS 329 (1983).
2. See C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 5, at 9 (3d ed. 1984).
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action is of little benefit to the trial lawyer.
On the other hand, an effective communicator who does not have a
meaningful understanding of the law of evidence is severely handi-
capped in the presentation of her case. Practical courtroom skills are of
little utility if the lawyer does not understand the evidentiary rules that
govern the admissibility of evidence. Objections to proferred evidence
will be sustained because the lawyer does not understand the eviden-
tiary theories under which the evidence is at least arguably admissible.
Many an ill-founded objection has been sustained because the propo-
nent of the evidence was unable to explain why the evidence should be
admitted.
Many treatises and other works on the law of evidence exist,3 but
all concentrate on the doctrine and rules governing the introduction of
evidence and devote relatively little attention to trial techniques. Like-
wise, many works have been written on effective trial techniques,4 but
all give the evidentiary principles behind those techniques relatively
short shrift. This article represents the author's attempt to begin bridg-
ing that gulf between the law school evidence class and the moment
when the lawyer stands alone in the courtroom faced with the task of
employing those venerable tenets, so well-learned and little-exercised.
We shall discuss some of the basic evidentiary considerations involved
in the planning and execution of a direct examination, as well as some
practical techniques that may be employed in order to use the law of
evidence to advantage when the judge says, "Call your first witness."'
I. SOME PRELIMINARY PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
A. Sequencing the Case
The order in which the lawyer will present witnesses should be a
major consideration in trial preparation. Chronological order is the
usual, but by no means exclusive, way to present testimony. The princi-
ples of primacy and recency are important to consider. The principle of
3. See generally M. GRAHAM. EVIDENCE TEXT, RULES. ILLUSTRATIONS AND PROBLEMS
(1983); G. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (1978); C. MCCORMICK, MC-
CORMICK ON EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1984); P. ROTHSTEIN, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1981); S. SALTZBURG &
K. REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL (4th ed. 1986); J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER,
WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE (1986); J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (Chadbourn rev. 1970); I. YOUNGER &
M. GOLDSMITH, PRINCIPLES OF EVIDENCE (1984).
4. See generally P. BERGMAN, TRIAL ADVOCACY (1982); S. GOLDBERG, THE FIRST TRIAL
(1982); K. HEGLAND, TRIAL AND PRACTICE SKILLS (1984); J. JEANS, TRIAL ADVOCACY (1975);
R. KEETON, TRIAL TACTICS AND METHODS (1973); T. MAUET, FUNDAMENTALS OF TRIAL TECH-
NIQUES (1980); J. TANFORD, THE TRIAL PROCESS (1983).
5. See generally Enfield, Direct Examination of Witnesses, 15 ARK. L. REV. 32 (1961).
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primacy states that people tend to believe that which they hear first.e
Counterbalancing factors, however, may cause the trier of fact to weigh
information presented later more heavily in forming a final judgment.
For example, defense counsel, as a part of voir dire or opening state-
ment, will usually ask the jurors to withhold judgment until they have
heard all the evidence. This can result in a recency effect-a greater
acceptance of facts presented later.' A case-in-chief is like a ham-
mock-if both ends are tied securely, it will probably hold up even if it
sags a little in the middle.
Many cases dictate their own sequence, and the lawyer has little
leeway in determining the order in which his witnesses will be called.
For instance, in a case arising out of an automobile accident to which
there was only one eyewitness, the eyewitness often must be called first
to paint the background for the scene. Other witnesses will then be
called to fill in details according to their knowledge. A policeman may
testify about his investigation of the accident after it occured. An am-
bulance driver may tell what she saw when she arrived at the scene. It
would make little sense to call witnesses with limited knowledge before
the eyewitness has provided an overall background. The policeman and
ambulance driver only paint in details. The case is often brought to its
dramatic climax by calling the plaintiff to the stand to allow the jury to
hear her story firsthand.
The lawyer is somewhat limited in sequencing the case by the
availability of witnesses. Simple considerations of courtesy and good
sense dictate that the lawyer not subpoena all his friendly witnesses
whose testimony may last only ten or fifteen minutes and have them sit
in the courthouse all day.
B. The Lawyer's Demeanor
1. The lawyer's physical position
The trial lawyer should emphasize her witness' testimony, not call
attention to herself. The witness should be center stage (although most
courtrooms are not arranged in that manner), and the lawyer must di-
vert attention from herself and direct the jury's attention to the wit-
6. The pioneering study, which coined the term "primacy," is reported in Lund, The Psy-
chology of Belief, 20 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 174, 183-91 (1925). See also Lawson,
Order of Presentation as a Factor in Jury Persuasion, 56 Ky. L.J. 523 (1968); Linz & Penrod,
Increasing Attorney Persuasiveness in the Courtroom, 8 LAW & PSYCHOLOGY REV. 1, 8 (1984).
7. See J. THIBAULT & L. WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 43-
45, 51 (1975); Lana, Three Theoretical Interpretations of Order Effects in Persuasive Communi-
cations, 61 PSYCHOLOGY BULL. 314 (1964).
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ness.' If a juror glances at counsel during the witness' answer and sees
the lawyer reading her next question, the juror will receive the subtle
message that the witness is not worth listening to. If a juror sees the
lawyer fidgeting, writing, or searching for a document during the wit-
ness' answer, that juror's attention will be diverted so that he will be
less likely to hear the witness' important testimony. If the evidence is
not important enough to demand undivided attention, the lawyer
should not call the witness. On the other hand, when a juror sees the
examining lawyer standing attentively still, intent on the witness and
his testimony, the juror will likely return his attention to the place it
belongs-the witness.
The direct examiner should position herself as far away from the
witness as possible.9 Ideally, she should be at the far corner of the jury
box. This causes the witness' voice to project across the jury box and
causes the witness to appear to be looking at10 and speaking to the
jury.11
2. The lawyer must listen.
A lawyer's main task during a trial is to listen. A moment's diver-
sion can be disastrous, and failure to listen is the inexperienced law-
yer's most common mistake. The lawyer should not whisper to his cli-
ent at counsel table. He must not think about his closing argument
while witnesses are testifying. He must listen to every word spoken.
The most important time to listen is while he is examining his own
witnesses. Listening to the witness is absolutely essential to effective
direct examination. The witness will lead the lawyer if the lawyer has
prepared the witness properly. If the lawyer listens, the witness will
usually indicate by his answer what the next question should be.
3. The lawyer must watch the witness.
The direct examiner must keep her eyes on the witness. By watch-
ing the witness the lawyer picks up valuable information that the jury
8. See T. MAUET, supra note 4, at 86; J. TANFORD, supra note 1, at 329.
9. The lawyer's freedom of movement is often restricted by the judge, some requiring counsel
to remain behind the lectern or even seated while examining witnesses. Some states impose such
restrictions by rule. See, e.g., R. UNIF. DECORUM DIST. CTs. MINN. 15, 51 MINN. STAT. ANN. 490
(West 1980); N.C. GEN. RULES OF PRAC. FOR THE SUPER. & DIST. CTS., 12 ANN. R. OF N.C. 1985.
10. Witnesses who avert their gaze are perceived to be less credible. Hemsley & Doob, The
Effect of Looking Behavior on Perceptions of a Communicator's Credibility, 8 J. APPLIED Soc.
PSYCHOLOGY 136 (1978).
11. See L. NiZER, My LIFE IN COURT 55 (1963).
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is also observing. The witness' demeanor-the fidgeting, perspiration or
downcast eyes---can often reveal more about the effect the witness is
having on the jury than his words." The lawyer who is not watching
her witness will miss this."3
The eyes really are the windows of the soul; so look the witness
right in the eye. It is difficult not to concentrate on what someone is
saying when looking him in the eye. Direct examination should be con-
versational, and eye contact with the lawyer puts the witness at ease.
The examiner can use eye contact to control her witness. When the
lawyer is looking expectantly at him, the witness is likely to continue
talking. When the lawyer looks down or away the witness is likely to
interpret the lawyer's demeanor as a signal to stop talking.
C. The Interrogative Dialogue
The basic building block of our Anglo-American adversary trial is the
interrogative dialogue. The law of evidence and the trial process are
based on the assumption that witnesses will answer specific questions.
This dialogue most effectively assures opposing counsel the opportunity
to interpose objections before inadmissible matters are mentioned. The
opponent may object to the evidence after the witness states the objec-
tionable matter and request that the judge admonish the jury to disre-
gard the testimony, but once the answer is heard by the jury such an
instruction is hardly effective 4 and a mistrial on this ground is rare.
For all of these reasons, it has long been recognized that a judge
may sustain an objection to narrative answers.' 5 This is entirely in the
judge's discretion, and the rules of evidence" do not contain any prohi-
12. See S. BALDWIN, ART OF ADVOCACY-DIRECT EXAMINATION, § 1.05[5][a] (1981); Pryor
& Buchanan, The Effects of a Defendant's Demeanor on Juror Perceptions of Credibility and
Guilt, 34 J. COMMUNICATION 92 (1984); Note, Nonverbal Communication in the Courtroom
Attorney Beware, 8 LAW & PSYCHOLOGY REV. 83 (1984).
13. See F. BAILEY, TO BE A TRIAL LAWYER 34-35 (1982).
14. Studies indicate that such admonitions may actually intensify the prejudicial effect of the
inadmissible testimony. Kalven, A Report on the Jury Project of the University of Chicago Law
School, 24 INS. COUNSEL J. 368, 377-78 (1957).
15. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, 6, at 12.
16. The FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE became effective July 1, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595,
88 Stat. 1926 (1975). Many states also have codified their laws of evidence. Arkansas adopted a
version of the REV. UNIF. R. EVID. effective July 1, 1976. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-1001 (1979). The
Arkansas Rules, with several specific and important exceptions, are the same as the Federal
Rules, including the section numbers. For convenience, future reference to "Rules" or "Rule" in
this article will indicate the Federal and Revised Uniform Rules of Evidence. Unless a different
Arkansas or Uniform Rule is mentioned, the reader may assume that the Arkansas and Uniform
Rule is the same as the Federal Rule.
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bition against witnesses giving narrative testimony.17 Nevertheless,
under the court's broad power to control the mode of interrogating wit-
nesses 8 most judges will sustain objections to overly broad narrative
answers.
19
A lawyer who uses the narrative technique to have a witness blurt
out inadmissible testimony acts unethically.2 0 The lawyer has a duty to
avoid eliciting clearly inadmissible testimony, and a duty to elicit ar-
guably inadmissible testimony in an interrogative manner so that op-
posing counsel has the opportunity to object and the court has the op-
portunity to rule. 1
From the proponent's point of view, the narrative is often not as
effective as the question-and-answer method. It is easier, in that anyone
can simply ask a witness to tell his story, but the trial lawyer is respon-
sible for making sure the jury hears the testimony on his side of the
case in a manner which will enhance his theory of the case. Most inex-
perienced witnesses are frightened and cannot tell their tales coherently
without the interrogator directing them. Any lawyer who doubts that
this is so should recall his own attempts to state his theory of the case
clearly and concisely in opening statement. If it is difficult for highly
trained legal scholars and trial advocates to tell the story, what an in-
surmountable obstacle it must be to the typical witness.
With the foregoing caveats, counsel should consider that narrative
testimony can be extremely effective . 2 The judge has a duty to "make
the interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of
truth . ..," and may allow narrative testimony if he feels it will ad-
vance that objective. A narrative by an articulate witness, relating ad-
missible evidence, can be the most effective way to present that evi-
dence to the jury. As a proponent, counsel must evaluate his
witnesses. Most cannot safely be turned loose to give a narrative; but
some witnesses, often those who have testified a number of times, can
17. See generally Denbeaux & Rinsinger, Questioning Questions: Objections to Form in In-
terrogation of Witnesses, 33 ARK. L. REv. 439 (1979).
18. FED. R. EVID. 611(a) and Unif. R. Evid. 611(a) [hereinafter referred to as FED. & UNIF.
R., EVID.].
19. See, C. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 6, at 12.
20. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.4(e) (1986), which states: "A
lawyer shall not in trial, allude to any matter that the lawyer does not reasonably believe is rele-
vant or that will not be supported by admissible evidence."
21. Id.
22. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 5, at 9.
23. FED. & UNIF. R. EvID. 611(a)(l).
24. See 3 F. BUSCH, LAW AND TACTICS IN JURY TRIALS § 344, at 394-95 (1960).
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be asked to narrate their relevant knowledge with favorable effect. 5 To
interrupt this type of witness with specific questions would probably
detract from the impact of his testimony.
II. THE REQUIREMENT TO ASK NONLEADING
QUESTIONS
The rules of evidence set forth the general rule: "Leading ques-
tions should not be used on the direct examination of a witness except
as may be necessary to develop his testimony. 'se This is qualified by
another section that states:
The court shall exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of
interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1) make the
interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the
truth, (2) avoid needless consumption of time, and (3) protect wit-
nesses from harassment or undue embarrassment.
2 7
The reasoning behind the traditional general rule that leading questions
are not permitted on direct examination is that a friendly or impartial
witness will most likely tell the truth if answers are not suggested to
him.' The judge's discretion is necessarily quite broad and reversal for
allowing improper leading questions is rare. 9
Aside from their general impropriety, leading questions diminish
the witness' credibility.3 0 The jury expects every witness to testify spon-
taneously from his own knowledge without being prompted. Testimony
will be more likely to be believed if the witness tells his story without
clues to what he is expected to say.
One way to avoid leading questions is to work without notes as
much as possible. Of course, almost every lawyer needs some notes. In
fact, a jury might suspect a lawyer with no notes at all of being unpre-
pared. However, the lawyer's notes should be brief reminders to inquire
into each necessary area or to introduce certain exhibits which must be
25. One experiment indicated that question-and-answer testimony was never significantly
more effective than narrative, but that sometimes narrative testimony was more effective. Conley,
O'Barr & Lind, The Power of Language: Presentational Style in the Courtroom, 1978 DUKE L.J.
1375, 1386-89.
26. FED. & UNIF. R. EVID. 611(c).
27. FED. & UNIF. R. EVID. 611(a). See Spears v. State, 280 Ark. 577, 660 S.W.2d 913
(1983).
28. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 5, at 10.
29. See 3 J. WIGMORE, supra note 3, §§ 774-78. But see Alexander v. Chapman, 289 Ark.
238, 711 S.W.2d 765 (1986) (trial court failed to stop leading questions after 28 objections to
leading defendant's expert witnesses in medical malpractice case).
30. See E. IMWINKELRIED, EVIDENTIARY FOUNDATIONS 4 (1980).
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authenticated through this witness. The lawyer who works without
notes, watching and listening to the witness, finds that her questions
become responsive to the witness' answers and are unlikely to be
leading.
A. Exceptions
Despite the general prohibition of leading questions on direct ex-
amination, a number of exceptions have arisen." In many instances,
permitting leading questions on direct is more likely to elicit truthful
responses than limiting the interrogator to nonleading questions."' In
recognizing the trial court's discretion to permit leading questions on
direct, the rules simply recognize the well-established common-law evi-
dentiary principle.33
1. The hostile witness
This exception to the rule against asking leading questions on di-
rect, the only one which is specifically incorporated into the rules of
evidence, is stated as follows: "When a party calls a hostile witness, an
adverse party, or a witness identified with an adverse party, interroga-
tion may be by leading questions.""
Whether a witness is hostile has traditionally been considered a
preliminary matter of fact left to the determination of the trial judge.8 5
31. See generally Enfield, supra note 6, at 35.
32. "In spite of the danger of suggestion by questions, there arise situations in which these
dangerous questions become a necessity-situations in which the risk of losing useful testimony
outweighs the risk of false suggestion." 3 J. WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 776, at 169.
33. See Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Campbell, 106 Ark. 379, 153 S.W. 256 (1913) (trial
judge's allowance of leading questions on direct examination did not constitute reversible error);
Midland Valley R.R. v. Hamilton, 84 Ark. 81, 104 S.W.540 (1907) (evidence of leading questions
on direct at trial did not result in substantial prejudice to claims of the plaintiff); Wallace v.
Bernheim, 63 Ark. 108, 37 S.W. 712 (1896) (exceptions by trial judge to general rule concerning
leading questions not grounds for reversible error). Dean Wigmore, in fact, ascribed an almost
cosmic origin to the rule: "From the beginning, and continuously, it has been declared that the
application of the principle is to be left to the discretion of the trial court." 3 J. WIGMORE, supra
note 29, § 770, at 157 (emphasis in original).
In 1869, Arkansas adopted a Code of Civil Procedure based upon the Kentucky code which
was, in turn, based upon New York's Field Code. Section 652 of the ARK. Civ. C. contained the
following language: "On the direct examination, leading questions are not allowed, except under
special circumstances, making it appear that the interests of justice require it." ARK. CiV. C. §
652 (1868). This provision was repealed when the UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE were adopted in
1975. 1975 Ark. Acts No. 1143, § 2. See also C. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 6, at 12.
34. FED. & UNIF. R. EvID. 611(c).
35. Swaim v. State, 257 Ark. 166, 514 S.W.2d 706 (1974). See generally Denbaux & Risin-
ger, , supra note 17, at 458.
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Even the adverse party was not always considered to be hostile.36 The
last sentence of Rule 611 (c) appears to change the established law sig-
nificantly 87 by allowing leading questions when examining adverse par-
ties and witnesses identified with them 8 whether or not they are in fact
hostile.3' Other witnesses must be shown to be hostile before the direct
examiner may ask them leading questions.4"
2. The child witness
Common-law rules of competency have largely been replaced by a
presumption that all witnesses are competent,41 leaving it to the jury to
determine the weight to be given the witness' testimony. The Federal
Rules accept the general proposition that all persons are competent to
be witnesses, but yield to state rules governing competency on issues in
36. Swaim, 257 Ark. at 171, 514 S.W.2d at 711. The Arkansas court cited with approval
Sinclair v. Barker, 236 Or. 599, 390 P.2d 321 (1964), a personal injury suit by a guest passenger
in an automobile against the host, who had insurance. The plaintiff called the defendant as a
witness. The trial court allowed leading questions without a finding of hostility in fact. The appel-
late court (although affirming on this point because no error was prejudicial enough to warrant
reversal) held that the trial court had misinterpreted the rule, saying: "Leading questions may be
allowed upon the direct examination of an adverse party if he appears to be hostile to the exam-
iner. Usually he is; sometimes he is not." 236 OR. at 607, 390 P.2d at 325. The court went on to
say: "Whether such witness is hostile and the extent to which leading questions may be put to him
are within the sound discretion of the trial court." 236 OR. at 607, 390 P.2d at 326. The Oregon
statute governing form of questions was almost identical to the Arkansas statute in effect at that
time. See supra note 33. Dean McCormick agreed that hostility of an adverse party must be
shown and makes no mention of any witness, even an adverse party, being subject to leading on
direct without a showing of hostility: "[T]he entire matter of the allowability of leading questions
is discretionary .. " C. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 6, at 12.
37. Haney v. Mizell Memorial Hosp., 744 F.2d 1467, 1477-78 (11th Cir. 1984).
38. Before enactment of the FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE the use of leading questions in
federal courts was governed by FED. R. Civ. P. 43(b) (abrogated by the FED. R. EVID.). Rule
43(b) allowed leading questions only of "an adverse party or an officer, director, or managing
agent of a public or private corporation or of a partnership or association which is an adverse
party..." without a showing of hostility.
39. Under FED. R. EvID. 611(c) a witness determined by the court to be "identified with" the
adverse party (such as an employee), although not "hostile" in fact to the proponent of his testi-
mony, may be interrogated by leading questions.
40. Arkansas retained the traditional rule requiring a showing of hostility in fact in all cases
until adoption of the Rules of Evidence in 1976. Present ARK. UNIF. R. EVID. 611 (c) is identical
to the Federal Rule.
41. Most recent cases when competency of a witness has been challenged have involved ei-
ther the witness' drug ingestion or mental competence. The witness is usually allowed to testify.
See, e.g., United States v. Saenz, 747 F.2d 930 (5th Cir. 1984) (mental competence) cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 3531 (1985); United States v. Odom, 736 F.2d 104 (4th Cir. 1984) (mental compe-
tence); United States v. Gutman, 725 F.2d 417 (7th Cir. 1984) (mental competence), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 880 (1984); United States v. Hyson, 721 F.2d 856 (1st Cir. 1983) (drug use); United
States v. Lightly, 677 F.2d 1027 (4th Cir. 1982) (criminal insanity); United States v. Meerbeke,
548 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1976) (drug use), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 974 (1977).
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civil cases to which state law supplies the rule of decision.42 States,
such as Arkansas, which have adopted the Revised Uniform Rules of
Evidence or another code, have also followed the trend to allow all per-
sons to testify. 8 Therefore, child witnesses who formerly were held in-
competent to testify" are now often allowed to testify if the court de-
termines that they have personal knowledge45 and understand the
meaning of telling the truth."
Because child witnesses often have difficulty relating matters
within their knowledge without some prompting, most courts allow the
examiner to ask leading questions. 7 The same judicial discretion to al-
42. FED. R. EvID. 601.
43. ARK. UNIF. R. EvID. 601 simply provides: "Every person is competent to be a witness
except as otherwise provided in these rules."
44. The common law left the determination of competency of child witnesses to the court.
Persons 14 years of age or older were presumed to be competent and there was no presumption
applicable to children below that age. Payne v. State, 177 Ark. 413, 6 S.W.2d 832 (1928) (seven-
year-old held competent to testify due to his showing of intelligence and understanding of obliga-
tion to tell the truth); Crosby v. State, 93 Ark. 156, 124 S.W. 781 (1910) (10-year-old held
incompetent to testify due to his inability to understand right from wrong); Flanagin v. State, 25
Ark. 92 (1867) (error to exclude testimony of 13-year-old without inquiry into degree of his un-
derstanding). See Barnhart, Theory of Testimonial Competency and Privilege, 4 ARK. L. REV.
377, 386-387 (1950). Section 663 of the old ARK. Civ. C. included among those statutorily de-
clared incompetent "infants under the age of ten years, and over that age if incapable of under-
standing the obligation of an oath." The Code was soon held not to apply to criminal cases.
Warner v. State, 25 Ark 47 (1869). The trend toward allowing children to testify (and leaving
the weight to be given their testimony to the jury) can be identified emerging at an early date. In
a case involving the hearsay statement of a six-year-old boy, the Arkansas Supreme Court held
that if the statement was otherwise admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule, the fact
that the declarant was incompetent would not bar its admission. Beal-Doyle Dry Goods Co. v.
Carr, 85 Ark. 479, 108 S.W. 1053 (1908). The same court held that the Code created a presump-
tion that persons over 10 years old were competent. Lamden v. St. Louis S.W. Ry., 115 Ark. 238,
170 S.W. 1001 (1924). The arbitrary, absolute prohibition of testimony by persons under 10 in
civil cases was finally laid to rest before enactment of the UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE by Act
375 of 1971, which provided: "Any infant, regardless of age, shall be competent to testify in a
civil action if capable of understanding the obligation of an oath."
45. FED. & UNIF. R. EVID. 602 provides: "A witness may not testify to a matter unless evi-
dence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that he has personal knowledge of the matter."
46. FED. & UNIF. R. EVID. 603 provides: "Before testifying, every witness shall be required to
declare that he will testify truthfully, by oath or affirmation administered in a form calculated to
awaken his conscience and impress his mind with his duty to do so."
47. See United States v. Rossbach, 701 F.2d 713 (8th Cir. 1983) (15-and 17-year-old rape
victims); United States v. Littlewind, 551 F.2d 244 (8th Cir. 1977) (13- and 14-year-old rape
victims); Scantling v. State, 271 Ark. 678, 609 S.W.2d 925 (1981) (11 -year-old rape victim who
was visibly upset at trial); Hamblin v. State, 268 Ark. 497, 597 S.W.2d 589 (1980) (13-year-old
sexual molestation victim in order to elicit truth); Reynolds v. State, 220 Ark. 188, 246 S.W.2d
724 (1952) (nine-year-old children, rape victim and witness); West v. State, 209 Ark. 691, 192
S.W.2d 135 (1946) (11-year-old rape victim); Begley v. State, 180 Ark. 267, 21 S.W.2d 172
(1929) (16-year-old victim of assault with intent to rape, inexperienced in the ways of the world
and appearing embarrassed); Wallace v. State, 177 Ark. 892, 9 S.W.2d 21 (1928) (1l-year-old
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low leading questions is extended to other witnesses with communica-
tion problems, such as those who are weak-minded or deficient in the
English language. 8
3. The witness whose recollection is exhausted
Sometimes a witness who once knew relevant information no
longer recalls that information. In such cases the law of evidence ac-
commodates the proponent by allowing the witness to refresh his mem-
ory by referring to some writing or object. 9 To lay a predicate for
refreshing recollection or reading a document containing past recollec-
tion recorded,50 leading questions are usually necessary and are nor-
mally allowed. 1
4. Preliminary and undisputed matters
In jurisdictions following the Federal or Revised Uniform Rules of
Evidence, these rules, including the rule against leading questions, gen-
erally do not apply to matters characterized as "preliminary. ' 52 Since
these matters of fact are determined by the court,5 3 it is deemed more
rape victim because of her youth, inexperience and ignorance); Crank v. State, 165 Ark. 417, 264
S.W. 936 (1924) (12-year-old assault victim in order to elicit truth). But see State v. Orona, 92
N.M. 450, 589 P.2d 1041 (1979) ("[E]very word describing the alleged offense [came] from the
prosecuting attorney .. "), Id. at -, 589 P.2d at 1045.
48. See Preston v. Denkins, 94 Ariz. 214, 382 P.2d 686 (1963) (witness 78-years-old, in poor
health, who had difficulty recalling events); Campion v. Lattimer, 70 Neb. 245, 97 N.W. 290
(1903) (25- or 27-year-old prosecutrix in paternity suit who was "very full of apprehension"). See
also 3 J. WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 778; C. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 6, at 13; Denbeaux &
Risinger, supra note 17, at 463-64; Note, Witnesses, 27 ARK. L. REV. 229, 258 (1973) (Special
Evidence Edition). In a criminal seduction case the prosecutrix, who was 17 at the time of trial,
was asked on direct: "State whether or not you would have permitted him to have intercourse with
you had it not been for that promise [of marriage]?" In overruling an objection, the trial judge
said: "It is a little leading, but it does seem you can't get the information without a little leading."
The appellate court, affirming, stated: "[T]he witness was young and had been subjected to a long
and searching cross-examination, a reading of which indicates that she was probably both timid
and ignorant." Murray v. State, 151 Ark. 331, 336, 236 S.W. 617, 618 (1922).
49. FED. & UNIF. R. EvID. 612. See infra Section VII(B).
50. FED. & UNIF. R. EVID. 803(5). See infra Section VII(C).
51. See M. GRAHAM. supra note 3, at 63-65; E. Imwinkelried, supra note 30, at 3-4 (1980);
C. MCCORMICK. supra note 2, § 6, at 13. But see Denbeaux & Risinger, supra note 17, at 460
(warning of the danger inherent in permitting leading questions for this purpose).
52. FED. & UNIF. R. EvID. 104(a) provides: "Preliminary questions concerning the qualifica-
tion of a person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall
be determined by the court . . . . In making its determination it is not bound by the rules of
evidence except those with respect to privileges." Id. See also E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 30, at
3 (1980).




likely to produce just results if the judge and lawyers are not bound by
formal rules of evidence as to these matters.
Some matters of fact are undisputed and the court will usually
allow these to be treated summarily by the use of leading questions."
This is primarily a time-saving device courts utilize to expedite the
trial. For example, "Officer, did you investigate an accident at the cor-
ner of Fourth and Poplar at around 9:30 on the evening of July 7,
1986?" is a leading question. Both counsel know that the officer did
investigate that accident. It is undisputed that he will answer the same
way whether a leading question is asked or a series of nonleading ques-
tions are asked. To save time, the court will allow leading questions
covering these undisputed preliminary matters.
Transitional statements by counsel to direct the witness to the next
area of inquiry are usually tolerated in the interest of expedience. 56
"Now, directing your attention to the morning of June 8 ....
B. What is a Leading Question, Anyway?
A leading question is one that suggests the answer to the witness."
There is no clear dichotomy between leading and nonleading. Some
questions are clearly either nonleading or leading, but there are many
degrees between.
Generally, questions that begin with the words, "who," "what,"
54. When a witness is asked about matters preliminary to the main topics of contro-
versy-matters essential to be brought out, and yet not themselves in controversy-such
as the witness' name, age, residence, relationship to the parties, and the like, it is obvi-
ous that there is usually no danger of improper suggestions, simply because there is no
motive for it.
3 J. WIMORE, supra note 3, § 775, at 168. See generally K. HEGLAND, supra note 4, at 16; C.
MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 6, at 13.
55. See E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 30, at 4; C. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 6, at 13;
Denbeaux & Risinger, supra note 17, at 462-63.
56. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, at 11. In Northwestern Nat'l Casualty Co. v. Mays, 273
Ark. 16, 616 S.W.2d 734 (1981) a question by defense counsel to his expert medical witness
whether the difference between the witness' 5% impairment rating of the plaintiff and the plain-
tiff's physician's 25-50% impairment rating was due to a different meaning given by each to the
word "disability" was held properly excluded as leading.
It has been suggested that leading by "suggestion" and leading by seeking "ratification" are
separate concepts. Denbeaux & Risinger, supra note 17, at 448-52. The Arkansas Supreme Court
seems to have adopted this distinction, citing the foregoing article and stating: "Suggestion occurs
when a question indicates the answer desired and ratification occurs when a question is suggestive,
contains factual detail which could and should originate with the witness and the witness adopts
the detail and the form in which it is expressed." Alexander v. Chapman, 289 Ark. 238, 246, 711
S.W.2d 765, 769 (1986). "Ratification" seems to be nothing more than a degree of suggestion,
rather than a separate concept.
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"when," "where," "why," or "how" are not leading.5 7 "Why" questions
are useful in two situations. First, they can add a note of spontaneity to
a rehearsed direct examination. Second, "why" is the classic redirect
question after the witness has been impeached with a prior inconsistent
statement. "Please explain why you said 'x' on the prior occasion."
A statement ending with an interrogative word or phrase (or sim-
ply a rising inflection of the voice) is clearly leading and is the raw
material from which effective cross-examinations are built. A question
that begins with "didn't you" is almost always leading. A question that
begins with "did you" may be leading or not, depending upon whether
the question suggests the answer to the witness. Merely stating the al-
ternative in an otherwise leading question will not cure it, for example,
"Did you or did you not ... ?"
III. A BASIC OUTLINE FOR DIRECT EXAMINATION
Although each witness is a unique challenge and there can be no
universally applicable formula for presenting direct testimony, the fol-
lowing general outline for organizing the sequence of testimony on di-
rect should be useful in preparing to examine most witnesses.
A. Introduce the Witness
Trial counsel should pretend that the witness is a friend she is in-
troducing to the jury. After asking his name, she should ask something
interesting and personal such as where he works.5 She should use sim-
ple, conversational language; for instance, "What is your job?" not
"What is the nature of your employment?"
B. Accredit the Witness
Since credibility is so important, the lawyer should ask some ques-
tions that will enable the witness to impress the jury with what a fine,
upstanding, believable person he is.59 Counsel must be careful not to
cross the line into the forbidden territory of character evidence. Gener-
ally, the character of a witness is considered irrelevant and inadmissi-
57. See E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 30, at 4.
58. Evidence of religious beliefs, however, is not admissible to enhance or impair credibility.
FED & UNIF. R. EvID 610.
59. One survey indicated that jurors tended to convict or acquit depending on whether they
liked the victim. Sannito & Arnolds, Jury Study Results: The Factors at Work, 5 TRIAL DIPLO-
MACY J. 6, 9 (Spring 1982).
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ble, e0 and evidence of his truthful character is admissible only after his
character for truthfulness has been attacked on cross-examination. 1
C. Position the Witness in the Action
The lawyer must lay a foundation to establish that the witness has
personal knowledge of the subject about which he is going to testify."
Not only is this foundation required by the law of evidence, but also by
common sense. This foundation must be solid enough to support the
weight the lawyer hopes the jury will give to the witness' testimony.**
D. Elicit the Witness' Information
Here the advocate is asking the witness to add whatever he knows
to the client's painting. This is the heart of his testimony. The propo-
nent should be particularly careful to ask nonleading questions during
this critical stage of the examination. The information elicited now
must be impressed on the jury's mind. The hammock principle of se-
quencing 64 applies to the arrangement of each witness' testimony as
well as to the arrangement of the order of the entire case. Start
strong65 and end strong.
The lawyer also must be aware of pacing. It is helpful to think of
the witness' testimony as a film that can be speeded up or run in slow
motion. The boring or unhelpful parts may be speeded up by use of the
narrative style or the leading question (subject to the admonitions dis-
cussed in Section II, supra). The crucial parts of the testimony can be
slowed down by asking precise questions which elicit the testimony in
60. FED. & UNIF. R. EVID. 404(a). Some character evidence going to the witness' truthful-
ness is allowed for purposes of impeachment of credibility. FED. & UNIF. R. EvID. 607-09. Repu-
tation or opinion evidence of the character of an accused in a criminal trial may be introduced by
the accused through other witnesses. FED. & UNIF. R. EvID. 404(a)(1) & 405(a). See Finnie v.
State, 267 Ark. 638, 593 S.W.2d 32 (1980).
61. FED. & UNIF. R. EVID. 608(a)(2). See Beard v. Mitchell, 604 F.2d 485 (7th Cir. 1979);
United States v. Lechoco, 542 F.2d 84 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
62. FED. & UNIF. R. EvID. 602 states:
A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support
a finding that he has personal knowledge of the matter. Evidence to prove personal
knowledge may, but need not, consist of the testimony of the witness himself. This rule
is subject to the provisions of Rule 703, relating to opinion testimony by expert
witnesses.
See generally Gorby v. Schneider Tank Lines, 741 F.2d 1015 (7th Cir. 1984); K. HEGLAND.
supra note 4, at 24; S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, supra note 3, at 305-06 (1982).
63. See generally 1 L. SCHWARTZ, PROOF, PERSUASION AND CROSS-EXAMINATION: A WIN-
NING NEW APPROACH IN THE COURTROOM § 2:05, at 207-08 (1973).
64. See supra § I(a).
65. See generally Parker, Applied Psychology in Trial Practice, 7 DEF. L.J. 33 (1960).
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small pieces.66 To allow a typical witness to tell the critical part of his
story in a narrative fashion is to risk having the jury miss the important
facts in the mass of information flowing forth. Lawyers, because of
their intimate knowledge of the evidence, sometimes forget that the
jury does not know what is important and what to listen for. The jury,
however, will only hear the evidence one time, and the lawyer's ques-
tions must make the witness emphasize those facts the jury should
remember.
The advocate must be wary of the witness' conclusions. Each indi-
vidual's perception is colored by his life experiences, and each may
draw conclusions which may not be warranted by the physical facts. It
has often been said that ordinary witnesses may normally testify only
to facts, not conclusions.67 Though this maxim is simple to state, it does
not square with reality because no one can relate anything without stat-
ing conclusions. The rules of evidence have significantly expanded the
admissibility of lay conclusions, 61 but those conclusions must be based
upon personal observation. 6" Before trial the lawyer must test each wit-
ness' conclusions by inquiring into the basis as if cross-examining the
witness.70 A conclusion without an adequate factual basis will be given
little weight by the jury.
The lawyer should consider bringing out damaging testimony on
direct to minimize its effect when elicited on cross-examination. How-
ever, this technique should be saved for really damaging or prejudicial
information that is certain to be brought out on cross-examination,71
such as an eyewitness' prior felony conviction. Inexperienced lawyers
often overdo this technique. The idea is merely to mention the damag-
ing matter in passing on direct as if it is of no particular significance,
not to dwell on it. If the admissibility of the damaging evidence on
cross-examination is in question, the lawyer should seek a ruling before
the witness takes the stand whether the cross-examiner will be allowed
to inquire into the matter. A favorable ruling keeps the entire matter
from the jury-a result far more favorable than merely diminishing the
66. See J. JEANS, supra note 4, § 9.16, at 223 (1975); T. MAUET, supra note 4, at 91-93.
With some articulate witnesses this process may be reversed, J. JEANS, supra § 9.5, at 216-17.
67. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 11, at 26-27.
68. See S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, supra note 3 at 445-46.
69. FED. & UNIF. R. EvID. 701. See K. HEGLAND, supra note 4, at 23 and infra § VI(A).
70. See J. TANFORD, supra note 1, at 340-41. The lawyer must, however, be careful of sug-
gesting specific words to the witness. Witnesses who use words that they could be unlikely to use
in ordinary speech have been found to be less credible. See Conley, O'Barr & Lind, The Power of
Language: Presentational Style in the Courtroom, 1978 DUKE L.J. 1375, 1389-90.
71. See K. HEGLAND, supra note 4, at 16-19.
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damage wrought by the evidence.
E. Quit
Do not be repetitious. To attempt to emphasize points by repeating
the witness' answer or eliciting the same answer several times is
inappropriate.
72
IV. RESPONDING TO OBJECTIONS
Both lawyers are entitled to a ruling on every objection made.
Some trial judges, either attempting to avoid error in the record or
because they were not listening, simply nod, say "proceed" or otherwise
avoid ruling on objections. The court reporter cannot record a judge's
nod. Sometimes nervous lawyers assume that an objection is sustained
and go on to the next question before the judge has an opportunity to
rule. Had the lawyer merely waited patiently, the judge might have
overruled the objection. If the court tries to let the matter slide by
without ruling, counsel should try to force the judge either to sustain or
overrule the objection. This can be done tactfully by asking the judge
what his ruling was. Two basic types of objections are encountered
while conducting direct examinations-objections to the form of the
question and objections to the admissibility of the testimony elicited.
A. Objection to the Form of the Question
Objections to the form of the question are almost always made to
the leading nature of the question. When the opponent's objection to
leading the witness is sustained, the examiner should rephrase the ques-
tion so that it is not leading. He should never let the objection pass
without eliciting the information originally sought by the leading ques-
tion. Proceeding to a different area of inquiry immediately after a sus-
tained objection to leading is likely to leave the jury with the impres-
sion that the lawyer was caught trying to do something improper. On
the other hand, when the examiner elicits the same information with a
nonleading question or series of questions, opposing counsel appears to
have been attempting to keep proper information from the jury and the
examiner appears to be in control. People are naturally curious and
jurors want to hear all the relevant evidence (as well as irrelevant mat-
72. See S. BALDWIN, ART OF ADVOCACY-DIRECT EXAMINATION § 1.04[8] (1981). How-
ever, some repetition of facts enhances the likelihood they will be remembered and believed. See
G. BELLOW & B. MOULTON, THE LAWYERING PROCESS 708-09 (1978); Colley, Principles of Di-
rect Examination, 2 TRIAL DIPLOMACY J. 13, 15-16 (Spring 1979).
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ters that they are not allowed to hear). The lawyer who satisfies their
curiosity by extracting the evidence over objection becomes a hero
while the lawyer who objected to the form of the question becomes an
obstructionist.
B. Objection to Admissibility of the Testimony
When opposing counsel objects to the testimony elicited, three car-
dinal rules govern the conduct of the proponent of the evidence:
1. Respond when possible
If the judge looks at the examiner for a response, he should briefly
and concisely state why he believes the testimony is admissible. If suc-
cessful, he can persuade the judge to admit the evidence. "Your Honor,
it's admissible as a declaration against interest under Rule 804(b)(3)."
While it is not necessary to cite the specific rule upon which the exam-
iner relies, to do so is impressive to many judges and intimidating to
many lawyers who are not intimately familiar with the rules of evi-
dence. The response must be addressed to the court, rather than the
opponent.
7s
2. Do not argue with the ruling
Many lawyers yield to the temptation to argue with the judge af-
ter he has sustained an objection. The court often then says something
like, "Counsel, I have ruled. Proceed." Some lawyers become rattled,
assume that the objection will be sustained, do not listen as the judge
overrules the objection, and then continue to argue. The judge may
then say, "I overruled the objection, Counsel. Why don't you get on
with it and ask the witness the question." This scenario hardly makes
the direct examiner appear smooth and efficient in the eyes of the jury.
3. Make an offer of proof after a sustained objection
If the case is lost because admissible evidence is excluded by the
court, counsel's remedy will be on appeal. If the trial record does not
show what the proof would have been, the appellate court will have no
73. Courtroom etiquette dictates that counsel speak only to the judge except when the judge
gives permission either to question a witness or address the jury. Counsel is never justified in
carrying on a verbal exchange with opposing counsel in open court. Counsel should stand when-
ever he speaks. The judge is always addressed as "Your Honor," not "Ma'am" or "Sir." State-
ments and arguments to the jury are prefaced with, "May it please the court." See generally S.
BALDWIN, supra note 72, § 1.05.
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information upon which to base a reversal."' Therefore, the proponent
of the evidence must make an offer of proof to preserve the issue by
causing the record to show what the evidence would have been had it
been admitted.75 Rule 103(a)(2) requires only that "the substance of
the evidence [be] made known to the court. . . ." This may be accom-
plished either by inclusion of a tangible proffered exhibit in the trial
record, having the witness answer the questions that would have been
asked in trial had the rejected testimony been allowed, or by the law-
yer's statement on the record of what the proof would have been.76 The
offer will be made out of the hearing of the jury."
The law of evidence provides one safeguard for the party whose
lawyer made no offer of proof when error is so clear that a miscarriage
of justice obviously occurred because the evidence was excluded. 78 In
case of "plain errors affecting substantial rights" an appellate court
can take notice although the errors were not brought to the attention of
the trial court. 79
V. HANDLING AND INTRODUCTION OF EXHIBITS
The efficient handling and introduction of exhibits (which is nor-
mally done as a part of the direct examination process) is an important
74. See Perkins v. Volkswagen of America, 596 F.2d 681 (5th Cir. 1979).
75. FED. & UNIF. R. EVID. 103 states:
(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits
or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected, and
(2) Offer of Proof. In case the ruling is one excluding evidence, the substance of the
evidence was made known to the court by offer or was apparent from the context within
which questions were asked.
In Killman v. State, 274 Ark. 422, 625 S.W.2d 489 (1981) the appellate court found no re-
versible error when the trial court in a battery case ruled inadmissible the testimony of a psychia-
trist as to the nonviolent tendencies of the accused. Defense counsel did not make an offer of proof
or make known to the trial court the purpose of the testimony. See also Boykin v. State, 270 Ark.
284, 603 S.W.2d 911 (1980); Parker v. State, 268 Ark. 441, 597 S.W.2d 586 (1980). See gener-
ally E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 30, at 14; J. WALTZ & J. KAPLAN, MAKING THE RECORD 57-
71 (1982). )
76. See J. WALTZ & J. KAPLAN, supra note 75, at 61-66.
77. FED. & UNIF. R. EVID. 103(c); See also J. WALTZ & J. KAPLAN, supra note 75, at 70-71.
78. FED. & UNIF. R. EvID. 103(d).
79. Id. UNIF. R. EVID. 103(d) omits the word "plain." This arguably indicates a more lenient
attitude in Arkansas with regard to the availability of reversal without an offer of proof. In Hen-
derson v. State, 279 Ark. 435, 652 S.W.2d 16 (1983), the Arkansas Supreme Court determined
that the trial court erred in sustaining the prosecutor's objection to defense counsel's attempt to
show bias of the prosecution witness by asking "what type of deal" the prosecution had given him
in order to obtain his testimony. Even though defense counsel made no offer of proof at the trial,
the appellate court found the offer to be unnecessary since the substance of the question was
apparent and the information sought was not available to defense counsel.
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source of building credibility with the jury. The technique of handling
exhibits properly is simple, but precise. The technique requires organi-
zation and discipline to master but, when mastered, causes most other
aspects of practical evidence law to come into focus. Since the proper
handling of exhibits requires a basic, overall command of the law of
evidence, this skill enables the trial lawyer to better organize all his
evidence, better analyze and organize his case, and in the end win more
cases. The old adage that a picture is worth a thousand words is unas-
sailably true. Knowing how to get exhibits into evidence expeditiously,
particularly over the objection of the opponent, places a lawyer in com-
mand of the courtroom. Conversely, attempting to introduce exhibits
only to have objections sustained is an effective way to lose a lawsuit.
Many judges are helpful to struggling lawyers. However, it hardly
enhances the lawyer's image with the jury, after he has asked a number
of questions only to have repeated objections based upon his failure to
lay the proper foundation sustained, to have the judge say, "Counsel,
perhaps it would help if you asked the witness. . ....
A. The Importance of Making a Record
As with all parts of the trial, the lawyer handling exhibits has two
audiences: the jury (his primary audience), and the appellate court,
which will review the record if the case is appealed. The appellate court
will have only the record to tell it what happened at the trial. It is
crucial that the record clearly identify every bit of evidence presented.
The following two simple rules will, if followed, assure that the trial
lawyer does not get hopelessly confused, confuse the court reporter and
jury, and ultimately confuse and offend the appellate court.
1. Keep a list of exhibits
The lawyer must keep an accurate record of the identifying num-
ber of each exhibit offered by each party, the exhibit number when
introduced, a brief description of the exhibit, and whether it was re-
ceived in evidence. He will refer to this list time and time again during
trial.
2. Always refer to each exhibit by number
Every exhibit must be marked with a number for identification
before or at the time it is first mentioned. Thereafter, it should always
be referred to by its number. The lawyer should never merely say "this
letter" or "this photograph." Every proposed exhibit should be referred
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to as, "what has been marked for identification as plaintiff's (or defend-
ant's) exhibit _" until it is received into evidence. After it is received
into evidence, it is part of the record of the case and the "for identifica-
tion" should be dropped. It should then always be referred to by its
number, such as "defendant's exhibit 5."
B. The Requirements for Admissibility
Exhibits are subject to the same five restrictions as testimonial evi-
dence: they must be relevant;" ° they must be unprivileged;81 they must
not be hearsay, or must be admissible under some exception to the
hearsay rule;8 2 they must be admissible under the best evidence rule; 3
80. FED. & UNIF. R. EViD. 401 defines the concept of relevance, which includes materiality
as an element. The determination whether evidence is relevant is a matter left to the discretion of
the trial court. Kellensworth v. State, 278 Ark. 261, 644 S.W.2d 933 (1983); Hamblin v. State,
268 Ark. 497, 597 S.W.2d 589 (1980); Dooley v. Cecil Edwards Constr. Co., 13 Ark. App. 170,
681 S.W.2d 399 (1984); James v. State, II Ark. App. 1, 665 S.W.2d 883 (1984). Rule 402 states
the basic proposition that only relevant evidence is admissible. Rule 403 gives the court power to
exclude relevant evidence if it is unduly prejudicial, confusing, misleading, time-consuming or
cumulative. Photographic evidence spawns many disputes, often because the proffered photo-
graphs are gruesome. Sometimes they are allowed: Fairchild v. State, 284 Ark. 289, 681 S.W.2d
380 (1984); Cotton v. State, 276 Ark. 282, 634 S.W.2d 127 (1982); Robinson v. State, 269 Ark.
90, 598 S.W.2d 421 (1980); Williams v. State, 267 Ark. 527, 593 S.W.2d 8 (1980); Morrison v.
Firemen's Ins. Co., 4 Ark. App. 351, 631 S.W.2d 310 (1982); Tucker v. State, 3 Ark. App. 89,
622 S.W.2d 202 (1981). Sometimes they are excluded: Bliss v. State, 282 Ark. 315, 668 S.W.2d
936 (1984); Harris v. Damron, 267 Ark. 1141, 594 S.W.2d 256 (1980); Ellis v. State, 4 Ark. App.
201, 628 S.W.2d 871 (1982). The weighing process is illustrated in Earl v. State, 272 Ark. 5, 612
S.W.2d 98 (1981). See also Kuntzelman v. Black, 774 F.2d 291 (8th Cir. 1985).
81. Article V of the Federal Rules of Evidence deals with privileges. It contains only one
rule, Rule 501, which merely states that privileges are those required by the Constitution, statutes
or "principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in
the light of reason and experience." FED. R. EvID. 501 defers to the applicable state law of privi-
leges as to elements of a civil case for which state law provides the rule of decision.
The Supreme Court included a number of codified privileges when it submitted the proposed
Fedral Rules of Evidence to Congress. The Congress, however, decided to leave federal courts
with great discretion to apply privilege rules according to the particular facts of each case. See C.
MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 76, at 182. See also Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47
(1980); Mitchell v. Roma, 265 F.2d 633 (3d Cir. 1959). Nonetheless, the Supreme Court's pro-
posed rules of privilege did set practical standards and many courts have followed them. See J.
WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER. supra note 3, § 501, at 501-28.
Arkansas adopted the Revised Model Rules of Evidence that contain essentially the same rules
of privilege as the Supreme Court's original proposed Federal Rules. They embody the more com-
monly accepted privileges in federal and state courts. ARK. UNIF. R. EViD. 501-12 included privi-
leges as to the following relationships and rights: (1) lawyer-client; (2) physician/psychotherapist-
patient; (3) husband-wife; (4) clergyman-penitent; (5) voting; (6) trade secrets; (7) state secrets;
and (8) identity of informers.
82. FED. & UNIF. R. EvID. 801 defines hearsay. FED. & UNIF. R. EviD. 802 says it is not
admissible unless made so under an exception. FED. & UNIF. R. EVID. 803 and 804 are lists of
exceptions.
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and they must be authenticated." The series of questions that must be
asked of a witness or several witnesses in order to clear the hurdles is
known as the "foundation" or "predicate." The proponent of the ex-
hibit must "lay the foundation" by clearing all five evidentiary hurdles
before the exhibit may be received into evidence.
The first four hurdles are often self-evident from the nature of the
exhibit. For example, the relevance of the contract that is the subject of
the suit is apparent. However, each element of admissibility must be
established through some evidence in the record before the exhibit may
be received in evidence, and if relevance is not apparent it must be
shown. For example, if receipt of notice is an element in the case, and
the party claiming to have given notice offers a letter purporting to
constitute notice, that letter only becomes relevant when some testi-
mony is presented from which a trier of fact may deduce that the letter
was received by the other party. 85 If relevance has not yet been estab-
lished at the time an exhibit is offered, it may be conditionally admit-
ted subject to being "connected up" later by counsel. 86
The fifth hurdle, authenticity, must be specifically established for
each exhibit introduced. The general concept of authenticity is that
each exhibit must be shown to be what it purports to be.87 Some kinds
of documents, primarily public documents under seal or certificate, are
self-authenticating, which means that no foundation need be laid to es-
tablish that the documents are what they purport to be. 88 Even if a
document is considered self-authenticating, the other four prerequisites
to admissibility must still be considered and appropriate questions
asked.
83. FED. & UNIF. R. EvID. 1001-05.
84. FED. & UNIF. R. EVID. 901-03.
85. See Swink & Co. v. Carroll McEntee & McGinley, Inc., 266 Ark. 279, 584 S.W.2d 393
(1979) (proof of routine practice of mailing confirmations of security transactions together with
evidence that one party received confirmation through the process was sufficient to present a jury
question whether another party received confirmation); see also FED. & UNIF. R. EVID. 406; see
Phillips v. State, 271 Ark. 96, 607 S.W.2d 664 (1980) (robbery victim's clothes found during
search of defendant's home admissible when connected to defendant).
86. FED. & UNIF. R. EviD. 104(b). When evidence is conditionally admitted, counsel must
remember to "connect it up" before resting his case. A motion to strike the evidence as irrelevant,
sustained by the court and coupled with an instruction to the jury to disregard it, can be
devastating.
87. FED. & UNIF. R. EVID. 901. The rule lists several types of authenticating evidence that
are sufficient. However, the list is suggestive, not exclusive, and any evidence showing that the
document is authentic should suffice. See generally S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, supra note 3, at
696-702.




Stipulations are time-savers for the court. They help make the
trial more interesting for the jury by minimizing the number of "law-
yer questions" asked in order to lay proper foundations and they save
work for the lawyers. However, to use stipulations effectively the law-
yer must know their consequences. By agreeing to an ill-advised stipu-
lation the lawyer may allow the opposing party to get inadmissible evi-
dence into the record by agreeing to its admissibility. On the other
hand, the lawyer who is unsure of the consequences may refuse to stip-
ulate when to do so would give away nothing, please the court and save
work.
Two kinds of stipulations apply to exhibits. First is the stipulation
that the exhibit is admissible. When admissibility is stipulated, all ob-
jections are waived; the proponent need lay no foundation, and may
simply announce the stipulation and offer the exhibit into evidence.
The second type of stipulation with regard to exhibits is that of
authenticity. When this stipulation is made, no foundation is required
to establish that the exhibit is what it purports to be. However, the
other requirements of admissibility are not stipulated and the opponent
may raise an objection on any of those grounds, that is, relevance, priv-
ilege, hearsay, or best evidence.
D. The Method of Laying the Foundation
The lawyer who handles exhibits efficiently makes a positive im-
pression on the jury. The lawyer who uses the following well-estab-
lished and relatively simple method for presenting exhibits will have
little trouble getting admissible exhibits into evidence.8 9
1. Qualify the witness
Questions must be asked to establish that the witness has personal
knowledge about the exhibit.' 0 For example, if the exhibit is a photo-
graph of the scene of an accident, the witness should be asked if she
was at the scene of the accident at the relevant time and whether she
observed what the scene looked like.
2. Refer to the marked exhibit
Exhibits should be marked with numbers or letters for identifica-
89. See generally E. IMWINKELRIED. supra note 30, at 55-56.
90. FED. & UNIF. R. EvID. 602.
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tion before trial, and many courts require this procedure. If an exhibit
has not been previously marked for identification, the lawyer should
have it marked by the court reporter before first referring to it in trial.
The first reference to the exhibit and all references thereafter should be
by number.
The proponent should not describe the exhibit before the witness
identifies it. He should merely say, "I have here what has been previ-
ously marked plaintiff's exhibit 6 for identification."
3. Show the exhibit to opposing counsel
The opponent is entitled to examine the exhibit before it is
presented to the witness for identification, even though the opponent
probably will have seen the exhibit before trial and will often have a
copy of it. After all, the copy presented in court may be altered. There-
fore, the proponent must always show the exhibit to opposing counsel
before showing it to the witness. The jury does not know that both
lawyers are already intimately familiar with every exhibit. To show an
exhibit to opposing counsel appears fair and courteous. If the proponent
neglects to show the exhibit, the skilled opponent, knowing of her abso-
lute right to look at each proposed exhibit, will ask the court to tell the
proponent to show it to her, and the court will do so to the embarrass-
ment of the proponent.
4. Ask permission to approach
Some courts allow lawyers virtually unlimited freedom of move-
ment. Others severely restrict the physical movement of lawyers. Many
courts require counsel to obtain the permission of the court before ap-
proaching the bench or the witness box. A trial lawyer should always
ask permission before approaching the witness box in each case until
the judge says permission is unnecessary, even if she has tried dozens of
cases before the judge and knows the judge does not require it. In the
first place, it is simply good manners. In the second place, the lawyer
avoids a reprimand from the judge should it be required. In the third
place, even if permission is not required, the lawyer requesting permis-
sion appears to the jury to be courteous and respectful of the court. In
short, there is no reason not to ask permission, and several reasons for
always doing so.
5. Show the witness the exhibit
The lawyer should hand the witness the exhibit, saying something
1986-87]
UALR LAW JOURNAL
like, "I show you defendant's exhibit 7 for identification. Please ex-
amine it." The lawyer should back away and give the witness an oppor-
tunity to examine the exhibit. The lawyer should not attempt to tell the
witness what the exhibit is.
6. Ask the necessary foundation questions
At this point the witness sits with the exhibit in hand, having ex-
amined it. The lawyer must now lay the foundation.9 Some common
foundation questions to be inserted at this step will be discussed below
in Section V(E). 92
7. Offer the exhibit into evidence
Unless the exhibit is formally offered and received into evidence by
the court, the witness may not testify about it, the jury cannot examine
it, and it is not part of the record on appeal. After being received in
evidence, the "for identification" is dropped when referring to the ex-
hibit. It becomes simply, "plaintiff's exhibit 8."
8. Examine the witness about the exhibit
After the exhibit is in evidence, it is proper to ask questions about
it other than those necessary to lay the foundation for its admissibility.
in the case of a photograph depicting the scene of an accident, the
witness may now be asked to describe the contents of the photograph
by pointing out to the jury various things shown in the photograph. The
witness' testimony about what is shown in the exhibit is helpful to the
jurors as they interpret it for themselves.
9. Publish the exhibit to the jury
Publication of an exhibit to the jury simply means showing it to
them. This can be done by reading relevant portions of a document,
distributing copies of a document, or passing the exhibit through the
jury box (as with a photograph). Sometimes lawyers get so absorbed in
the trial, struggling to overcome objections and get their exhibits into
evidence, that they forget to show them to the jury. When this happens,
the jury is deprived of the evidence in reaching a verdict and will feel
resentful toward the responsible lawyer. The word "publish" should not
be used when asking permission to show an exhibit to the jury. Instead,
91. See supra § V(B).
92. See infra § V(E).
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the lawyer should simply ask to "show," "read," or "pass" the exhibit.
E. Some Common Foundation Questions
When the lawyer arrives at step 6 of the method of laying a foun-
dation,"3 he must decide what questions to ask the witness in order to
establish admissibility of the exhibit. Some types of exhibits are so rou-
tinely introduced that similar questions may be used to lay the founda-
tion in most cases. Questions applicable to three of these common types
of exhibits-real evidence, letters and business records-are discussed
here.
1. Real Evidence"
Real evidence consists of things that have some independent evi-
dentiary significance in the case, rather than being merely illustrative
of other testimony.95 Examples are the gun with which the accused shot
the victim, the bottle that contained a poisonous beverage, or the stick
with which the defendant beat the plaintiff. It is essential to show that
the item presented in court is actually the item in question. It must also
be established that the item is in the same condition as at the time of
the occurence in question, or that any change in its condition is so mi-
nor that its probative value remains greater than its prejudicial effect."
Three propositions must be explored: (1) What is it? (2) how can you
recognize it? (3) is it in the same condition as at the relevant time
(usually when the witness first saw it)?
a. What is it?
The first proposition, "What is it?," can be established by one,
nonleading question. Maybe the simplicity of this question makes it al-
most impossible for many lawyers to ask. The lawyer should not de-
tract from the witness' credibility by asking a leading question such as,
"Can you identify defendant's exhibit 9 as the knife you saw in the
victim's hand?" The lawyer should simply ask the witness what the
object is.
93. See supra § V(D)(6).
94. See generally E. IMWINKELRIED. supra note 30, at 81-85.
95. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 212, at 667.
96. Id. See FED. & UNIF. R. EvID. 403.
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b. How do you recognize it?
The questions that must be asked to establish the second proposi-
tion, "How do you recognize it?" are determined by the character of
the object itself. Objects that have a unique characteristic, so that there
is little likelihood that the item presented is not actually the item in
question, can usually be authenticated by pointing out the unique char-
acteristic. 97 A gold plated cigarette lighter engraved with the defend-
ant's initials is an example. Testimony that the witness recognizes the
object by reference to the unique characteristic is usually sufficient to
show that it is truly the object in question. After the witness answers,
counsel may move on to the third area of inquiry. 8
Some types of real evidence, however, do not contain unique char-
acteristics, and a "chain of custody" must be established to show that
this exhibit is actually the thing it purports to be. Indistinguishable or
fungible items such as bags of cocaine and whiskey bottles cannot be
shown to be the item unless their whereabouts are accounted for from
the moment they became relevant to the case. Some person must testify
from personal knowledge as to the whereabouts of the item each mo-
ment so as to trace its custody from the event" to the trial, or to some
time before the trial when the object's relevance to the action is estab-
lished, as when a bag of cocaine seized from the defendant has been
analyzed. If it is shown that the bag was seized from the defendant and
its custody is accounted for through the time its contents were tested
and found to be illegal drugs, the whereabouts or possibility of tamper-
ing after that should not affect the item's admissibility. Each witness
will normally be asked when and how the evidence came into her pos-
session, what she did with it and when and how she relinquished cus-
tody of it.
c. Is it in the same condition?
The questions that must be asked to establish the third proposi-
97. See FED. & UNIF. R. EvID. 901(b)(4).
98. Many judges require a chain of custody to be established for evidence that the logic of
the law of evidence would make admissible without accounting for its whereabouts from event to
trial. Particularly in criminal cases in which the prosecution is the proponent of the evidence,
judges tend, if they err at all, to err on the side of caution and keep evidence out whenever there is
a question as to its admissibility. When in doubt, the lawyer should be prepared to establish a
chain of custody.
99. Minor omissions in the chain, particularly when not pointed out by the opponent, may
not be fatal. Titus v. State, 268 Ark. 9, 593 S.W.2d 164 (1980); Meador v. State, 10 Ark. App.
325, 664 S.W.2d 878 (1984).
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tion, that the item is substantially unchanged, also depend upon the
character of the item itself.100 The unchanged condition of items not
subject to tampering or alteration, such as guns, 01 monkey wrenches,
and tire tools, may be established by asking the witness whether the
evidence is in the same condition as when first observed. Items that can
more readily be altered or tampered with must be treated more care-
fully by courts, and testimony to establish that there is a probability0"
that the evidence is substantially unchanged is required.108 The availa-
bility of such testimony depends on the care with which evidence was
preserved before trial10 by the investigative agency, the party, or those
under the direction of the lawyer. After a witness testifies that the ob-
ject left her possession substantially unchanged from the time it en-
tered her possession, she must be prepared to say what protective steps
were taken to assure that no one tampered with or altered the evidence.
To enable their personnel to establish this point on the witness stand,
investigative agencies have established procedures for labelling evi-
dence, giving receipts when it changes possession, and storing it in evi-
dence lockers to which only authorized persons have access.
2. Letters
The foundation required for admission of a letter differs according
to the purpose for which the letter is offered.10 5 When the relevance of
a letter depends upon the identity of the sender, that identity must be
proven, usually by identification of the signature.
The first question of the witness authenticating a letter should be,
"Do you recognize plaintiff's exhibit 1?" Then the witness should be
asked, "Under what circumstances?" and he should describe the cir-
cumstances that enable him to authenticate the letter. For example, "I
wrote and mailed it to the plaintiff." or, "I typed it for Ms. Evans and
placed it in the outgoing mail." or, "I received it in the mail."
Finally, the signature of the writer must be identified. If the writer
is testifying, he can identify his own signature. Any witness other than
100. See State v. Lewis, 401 A.2d 645 (Me. 1979).
101. State v. Kroeplin, 266 N.W.2d 537 (N.D. 1978).
102. Hoover v. Thompson, 787 F.2d 449 (8th Cir. 1986) (missing seal on blood sample went
to credibility, not admissibility. Court must be satisfied to reasonable probability that article is
unchanged.
103. See Horne v. State. 12 Ark. App. 301, 677 S.W.2d 856 (1984) (murder victim's shirt
admissible although his mother had washed it).
104. See Ballou v. Henri Studios, Inc., 656 F.2d 1147 (5th Cir. 1981).
105. For an excellent treatment of the authentication of private writings, including sample
questions, see E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 30, at 56-62.
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the writer, however, must be able to recognize the signature as that of
the alleged writer. Nonexpert opinion as to handwriting is admissible if
the opinion is based on familiarity not acquired for purposes of the
instant litigation.'" When eliciting the opinion of a lay witness con-
cerning a signature or other handwriting, the lawyer must establish
how the witness became familiar with it. For instance, after the witness
testifies that this is Ms. Evans' signature, the lawyer might ask, "How
do you recognize it?" to which the witness, her secretary, will reply,
"I've seen her sign it hundreds of times in the office." Handwriting
may also be authenticated by having an expert witness compare the
writing on the exhibit with an authenticated example of the alleged
writer's handwriting or signature. 107 In some cases, the jury may make
the comparison itself, 08 in which case authentication of the handwrit-
ing becomes a matter of weight, not admissibility. °10
3. Business records
In addition to authenticating documents as the business records of
a business entity, the proponent is faced with the problem that business
records are hearsay. Authentication is usually easily accomplished, but
the hearsay objection can only be overcome if the requirements of the
"business records" exception to the hearsay rule are met."' The lan-
guage of the exception as contained in the rules"' provides a checklist
for the examiner. The following questions will normally establish the
106. FED. & UNIF. R. EvID. 901(b)(2). See United States v. Barker, 735 F.2d 1280 (11th
Cri. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 933 (1984); United States v. Barron, 707 F.2d 125 (5th Cir.
1983); United States v. Pitts, 569 F.2d 343 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied. 436 U.S. 959 (1978).
107. FED. & UNIF. R. EVID. 901(b)(3). See United States v. Mauchlin, 670 F.2d 746 (7th
Cir. 1982).
108. FED. & UNIF. R. EvID. 901(b)(3). See Greater Kansas City Laborers Pension Fund v.
Thummel, 738 F.2d 926 (8th Cir. 1984).
109. See United States v. Clifford, 704 F.2d 86 (3d Cir. 1983).
110. FED. & UNIF. R. EVID. 803(6) describes a record admissible as an exception to the
hearsay rule as:
A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, condi-
tions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near the time by or from information transmit-
ted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business
activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to make the memo-
randum, report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custo-
dian or other qualified witness, unless the source of information or the method or cir-
cumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness. The term "business" as used
in this paragraph includes business, institution, association, profession, occupation, and
calling of every kind, whether or not conducted for profit.
See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 505 F. Supp. 1190 (E.D. Pa. 1980); Cates
v. State, 267 Ark. 726, 589 S.W.2d 598 (1979).
111. FED. & UNIF. R. EVID. 803(6).
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requirements of the "business records" exception to the hearsay rule:
(1) When was the record prepared? (2) Who transmitted the informa-
tion from which it was prepared? (3) What knowledge did the person
transmitting the information have of the matters contained therein? (4)
Was the record kept in the course of a regularly conducted business
activity?1 12 and (5) Was it the regular practice of the organization to
make the record?118
VI. THE PRESENTATION OF EXPERT TESTIMONY
A. The Nature of Opinions
The inferences or conclusions to be drawn from facts in evidence
are the province of the jury. For this reason, the law of evidence has
long forbidden ordinary witnesses to suggest the inferences or conclu-
sions that should be drawn from the facts they relate. They may only
testify to what they have sensually perceived, and their testimony must
be based on personal knowledge. 4
There is, however, no clearly defined line between relating facts
and stating an opinion. No person can speak without expressing conclu-
sions based upon personal experience. Recognizing that the search for a
dividing line between fact and opinion is fruitless, and that any line
drawn would be arbitrary and artificial, modern evidence codes have
liberalized the opinion rule to allow lay witnesses to express rational
opinions based on their personal observation, 15 always subject to the
discretion of the court to decide whether the opinion will be helpful to
the jury in understanding the evidence. 116 To this extent, every witness
112. See Paddack v. Dave Christensen, Inc., 745 F.2d 1254 (9th Cir. 1984).
113. See United States v. Lemire, 720 F.2d 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S.
1226 (1984). See generally E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 30, at 62-65, 170-73.
114. FED. & UNIF. R. EVID. 602.
115. Smith v. Davis, 281 Ark. 122, 663 S.W.2d 165 (1983) (point of impact of automobiles);
Tillman v. State, 275 Ark. 275, 630 S.W.2d 5 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1201 (1983) (state-
ment that car had backed out of driveway before witness saw it, based on its position and move-
ment when witness saw it); Avery v. State, 271 Ark. 584, 609 S.W.2d 52 (1980) (sanity); Mathis
v. State, 267 Ark. 904, 591 S.W. 2d 679 (1979) overruled on other grounds, sub nom. Rogers v.
State, 10 Ark. App. 19, 660 S.W.2d 949 (1983) (whether shooting was accidental or intentional).
116. FED. & UNIF. R. EVID. 701 states:
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, his testimony in the form of opinions or
inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on
the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony
or the determination of a fact in issue.
See Miller v. Tipton, 272 Ark. 1, 611 S.W.2d 764 (1981) (testimony that defendant was "going
like a bat out of hell" was excluded as not helpful); see also Graham v. State, 2 Ark. App. 266,
621 S.W.2d 4 (1981) (testimony that defendant was "scared to death" excluded as irrelevant).
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is a potential expert.
As the world becomes more technologically complex, evidence be-
comes more difficult for jurors to understand, and it becomes more dif-
ficult for them to decide what inferences they should draw from evi-
dence presented. To aid the jury's understanding, whenever the court
determines that it would be helpful 17 to the trier of fact to have the
benefit of an expert's opinion on a subject 18 a witness who has been
qualified as an expert" on that subject may be allowed to suggest to
the jury what inferences should be drawn from the facts in issue.12 0
117. Caldwell v. State, 267 Ark. 1053, 594 S.W.2d 24 (1980). However, despite the "help-
fulness" standard established by the Uniform Rule, the Arkansas Supreme Court still occasionally
dredges up the discarded standard that the testimony must be "beyond the jury's ability to under-
stand." B. & J. Byers Trucking, Inc. v. Robinson, 281 Ark. 442, 665 S.W.2d 258 (1984) (acci-
dent reconstruction). When the subject matter is within the knowledge or experience of the jury, it
may not meet the "helpfulness" criterion. United States v. Arenal, 768 F.2d 263 (8th Cir. 1985).
118. The question whether expert testimony will assist the trier of fact is sharply presented
when a party seeks to present the result and interpretation of some novel scientific or experimental
technique. The traditional test, first enunciated in Frye v. United States, 293 F.2d 1013 (D.C. Cir.
1923), is that "the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have
gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs." Id. at 1014. In Frye, testi-
mony concerning the results of a predecessor of the polygraph test was refused. Frye is still fol-
lowed by many courts. See Gianelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v.
United States, a Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197 (1980). Since the advent of the
Federal Rules, some commentators have argued that although "general acceptance" might be a
valid prerequisite for a court to take judicial notice of novel scientific evidence, the standard for its
admissibility should be governed by the general principles of helpfulness in Rule 702 and rele-
vance versus harmful effect in Rule 403. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 203, at 607. See also J.
WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER. supra note 3, § 702[03], at 702-18; McCormick, Scientific Evidence:
Defining a New Approach to Admissibility. 67 IowA L. REV. 879 (1982). Even under the helpful-
ness-relevance-harm analysis, courts continue to reject evidence of polygraph examination results.
See Brown v. Best Prods. Inc., 18 Ohio St. 3d 32, 479 N.E. 2d 852 (1985); State v. Brown, 297
Or. 404, 687 P.2d 751 (1984). A newer type of "lie detector" test, the psychological stress evalu-
ator or voice stress test, has met similar rejection by courts. See Sabag v. Continental South
Dakota, 374 N.W.2d 349 (S.D. 1985).
119. Whether the witness is qualified is left to the discretion of the trial court. Blair v. State,
284 Ark. 330, 681 S.W.2d 374 (1984); Parker v. State, 268 Ark. 441, 597 S.W.2d 586 (1980);
Dixon v. State, 268 Ark. 471, 597 S.W.2d 77 (1980); Beck v. State, 12 Ark. App. 341, 676
S.W.2d 740 (1984); Whaley v. State, 11 Ark. App. 248, 669 S.W.2d 502 (1984). The standard in
Arkansas is whether the witness has knowledge of the subject beyond that of ordinary persons.
Dildine v. Clark Equip. Co., 282 Ark. 130, 666 S.W.2d 692 (1984). See also Koelzer v. Bagley,
13 Ark. App. 48, 680 S.W.2d 111 (1984). But cf Williams v. Carr, 263 Ark. 326, 565 S.W.2d
400 (1978) (trial court was reversed for allowing a funeral director to give his opinion of what
constitutes "more than normal grief," where his qualifications were that he had participated in
over 200 funerals during 24 years and had attended an "institute of mortuary science"). Demon-
strated practical experience may be as sufficient as academic training in qualifying a witness as an
expert. Circle J. Dairy, Inc. v. A.O. Smith Harvestor & Prods., Inc., 790 F.2d 694 (8th Cir.
1986). Compare Friendship Heights Assoc. v. Vlastionil, A.I.A. Koubek, 785 F.2d 1154 (4th Cir.
1986).
120. FED. & UNIF. R. EviD. 702 states: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowl-
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The witness qualified as an expert in a subject, unlike the lay wit-
ness offering an opinion, is not limited to facts personally observed in
forming his opinion.1 1 The same witness may be a lay witness as to
some matters, an expert expressing an opinion based on personal obser-
vation as to others, and an expert basing his opinion on facts made
known to him as to still other issues. A treating physician may, for
example, express his opinion as to the nature and duration of his pa-
tient's injuries based upon his personal observation;12' but a physician
who has never seen the patient may also express such an opinion based
solely on his review of the patient's medical history made available to
him for examination before trial.1 8 An expert with no prior knowledge
of the case may be allowed to sit in the courtroom and hear the testi-
mony in the case, then offer his opinion based on that testimony.'
B. The Hypothetical Question
The facts made known to an expert and upon which he bases his
opinion may be assumed. In other words, the lawyer may ask the ex-
pert to assume the existence of certain facts and ask the expert to ex-
press his opinion based on those assumed facts. A question seeking an
expert's opinion based upon a set of assumed facts is called a hypothet-
ical question. The law requires that all relevant facts be included in a
hypothetical in order for the opinion to be relevant. This is time-con-
suming at best, requiring lawyers to devote much time to the careful
drafting of hypothetical questions and triggering objections as to the
content of the questions. At worst, it allows lawyers to prepare long
hypotheticals that, in effect, constitute an extra closing argument made
during examination of the expert1 25 with the lawyer recounting the
edge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." The expert's testimony may be excluded if the
court finds it would confuse the jury. United States v. Curnew, 788 F.2d 1335 (8th Cir. 1986);
cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 438 (1986).
121. FED. & UNIF. R. EVID. 703. See Campbell v. State, 265 Ark. 77, 576 S.W.2d 938
(1979); Bowman v. McFarlin, I Ark. App. 235, 615 S.W.2d 383 (1981).
122. See Rheingold, The Basis of Medical Testimony, 15 VAND. L. REv. 473, 489-91
(1962).
123. Id.
124. When the rule excluding witnesses from the courtroom is invoked (FED. & UNIF. R.
EVID. 615), the judge has discretion whether to allow the expert witness to remain and hear the
testimony as a basis for his opinion. Arkansas Power & Light Co. v. Melkovitz, 11 Ark. App. 90,
668 S.W.2d 37 (1984).
125. The closing argument is, in essence, the lawyer's opportunity to suggest to the jury the
inferences that they should, in that lawyer's view of the case, draw from the evidence.
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facts to his best advantage and the witness, with all the credibility con-
ferred upon him by judicial acceptance as an expert, suggesting the
inference to the jury.1
26
The hypothetical question, though still viable, does not have to be
used as frequently because the rules of evidence give lawyers more flex-
ibility in eliciting expert opinions. 127 In jurisdictions that have adopted
modern codes of evidence, the expert may offer his opinion without first
disclosing the underlying basis for that opinion unless the court, in the
exercise of its duty to assure a fair trial, 128 requires that the data upon
which the witness relies be revealed before he states his opinion.1 29 If
the expert has an insufficient or flawed basis for his opinion, this fact
may be brought out on cross-examination. 80
Subject to the right and obligation of the judge to rule otherwise,
the lawyer operating under the rules has the option to use a hypotheti-
cal question, to ask the expert to describe the basis of his opinion, or to
elicit the opinion, after qualifying the witness as an expert,131 without
asking the basis of the opinion. Obviously, if a credible expert has a
sound basis for his opinion, the lawyer will give him an opportunity to
describe that basis.
C. Use of Inadmissible Data
Another provision of the rules that facilitates the lawyer's presen-
tation of expert testimony in trial is the relaxation of the doctrine that
required every matter upon which the expert based his opinion to be
admissible in evidence. Under the traditional rule, a treating physician
could not testify that he based his diagnosis partly on an x-ray report
provided by a radiologist because the contents of the x-ray report would
be hearsay. Before the treating physician could offer an opinion based
in part on the x-ray report, the radiologist would have to be called as a
witness to get the report into evidence. Calling witnesses to authenti-
126. See Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 VAND. L. REv. 414, 426-27 (1952).
127. See S. SALTZDURG & K. REDDEN, supra note 3, at 451.
128. FED. & UNIF. R. EvID. 611(a) provides: "The court shall exercise reasonable control
over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1) make the
interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth, (2) avoid needless con-
sumption of time, and (3) protect witnesses from harrassment or undue influence."
129. FED. & UNIF. R. EvID. 705.
130. Id. See Arkansas State Highway Comm'n v. Schell, 13 Ark. App. 293, 683 S.W.2d 618
(1985); Bull v. Brantner, 10 Ark. App. 229, 662 S.W.2d 476 (1984).
131. The qualification of the witness as an expert involves asking a series of questions, the
answers to which demonstrate the requisite "knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education"
to enable him to give his expert opinion on the subject. FED. & UNIF. R. EviD. 702. See Advisory
Committee's Note, 56 F.R.D. 183, 282 (1973).
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cate everything the expert witness relied on in forming his opinion is a
time-consuming process, is valueless to the jury, and can be prohibi-
tively expensive for the parties. Recognizing that experts in other field
rely on the work product of colleagues in performing their work with-
out worrying whether it is hearsay, the rules provide that the matters
relied on by the expert need not themselves be admissible in evidence if
they are of a type reasonably relied on by experts in the witness'
field.182 The treating physician, for example, may now testify that he
relied on x-ray reports in making his diagnosis, so long as he testifies
that to do so is a reasonable practice in his field of expertise. 8 Those
reports would be admissible if a qualified witness were called to au-
thenticate them.
The rule that the matters upon which the expert relies do not
themselves have to be admissible is, however, broader in its practical
effect at trial. It opens the door for counsel to make the jury aware of
the existence of otherwise inadmissible evidence, which could not be
introduced on its own merit, by having an expert witness state that he
based his opinion in part on that evidence. 1
D. Direct Examination of the Expert
The presentation of expert testimony involves four steps. Each step
may be emphasized or minimized depending upon such factors as the
qualifications of the expert, the subject matter of the testimony, or the
manner in which the expert reached his opinion. It is the trial lawyer's
responsibility to plan the presentation of the testimony-its pacing, the
emphasis to be placed on each of the four steps, whether to employ the
narrative style, the sequence of the steps-in order to make the testi-
mony most impressive to the jury.
An expert witness is placed on the stand for one ultimate pur-
pose-to state an opinion. Therefore, the lawyer must remember that
the question eliciting the opinion and the opinion itself are the climac-
tic event of this witness' testimony. Every question and answer must be
planned to assure that every juror hears and remembers that opinion.
In cases in which the expert's testimony is complex or lengthy, it is
132. FED. & UNIF. R. EVID. 703. See Dixon v. Ledbetter, 262 Ark. 758, 561 S.W.2d 294
(1978).
133. See Advisory Committee's Note, supra note 131, at 283.
134. This rule is, of course, subject to the relevance-harm balancing test of FED. & UNIF. R.
EVID. 403. It has been suggested that a limiting instruction should often be utilized to explain to
the jury that the inadmissible data was not admitted for its truth. S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN.
supra note 3, at 467.
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often best for the lawyer to ask for the opinion early while the jury is
still attentive. The rules now give the lawyer this option.18 ' In other
cases, those in which the witness is a captivating speaker and the sub-
ject matter of his testimony is interesting, the lawyer may elect to bring
the presentation to a dramatic climax by eliciting the opinion with her
last question.
The four steps are: (1) Establish the expertise; (2) tie the expert to
the case; (3) establish the basis for the opinion; and (4) ask for the
opinion. Steps 1 and 2 should always be done in that order. Step 1 is a
prerequisite in order to allow the witness to express an opinion. 1so Step
2 is necessary to establish that the testimony will assist the jury3 7 and
to meet the test of relevancy.1 8 The order of steps 3 and 4 may be
reversed depending on the considerations discussed above.
1. Step 1: Establish the expertise
If the witness is a nationally recognized authority in his field, the
lawyer will undoubtedly dwell on his background and qualifications.' 3
Opposing counsel will often offer to stipulate the qualifications of the
undeniable expert in order to keep the jury from hearing them, thereby
minimizing the witness' credibility, while appearing generous and rea-
sonable. Some judges, in the interest of moving the case along, will cut
off the examiner before she has had the witness describe all of his qual-
ifications, but the proponent should resist the opponent's tactic by re-
sponding with a statement such as, "Your Honor, I appreciate coun-
sel's offer, but I believe the jury is entitled to hear the outstanding
qualifications of Dr. Schweitzer." On the other hand, if the witness'
qualifications, while sufficient to qualify him to give his expert opinion,
are inferior to the opponent's expert on that subject, the lawyer may
wish to ask only enough qualification questions to convince the court
that the witness' opinion should be allowed.
135. FED. & UNIF. R. EVID. 705.
136. FED. & UNIF. R. EvID. 702.
137. Id.
138. FED. & UNIF. R. EvID. 401 requires all evidence to be relevant, i.e., tending to make the
existence of some fact of consequence in the trial more or less probable. FED. & UNIF. R. EVID.
403 gives the court broad discretion to exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substan-
tially outweighed by danger of prejudice, confusion, misleading the jury, delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence. See Gruzen v. State, 267 Ark. 380, 591 S.W.2d 342
(1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 852 (1980), affd. 276 Ark. 149, 634 S.W.2d 92 (1982), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1020 (1982).
139. "The qualifications of an expert are like the pedestal for a statue-the more imposing,
the nobler the subject above it appears." L. NIZER, supra note 11, at 314.
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The direct examiner should have the witness explain the signifi-
cance and importance of professional degrees and certifications. For in-
stance, the physician witness who is board certified in his speciality
should be asked to describe what he had to do to obtain certification.
2. Step 2: Tie the expert to the case
This step is no different from the procedure the direct examiner
follows with every witness, lay or expert. In order for jurors to give
weight to the witness' testimony, they must know how the witness
learned what he is to testify about. The jury wants and is entitled to
know how this expert gained the familiarity with the facts in issue
which renders his opinion worthy of consideration. He may have gained
his knowledge by actual observation (such as a real estate appraiser
who performed an appraisal of property), by examination of furnished
data (such as a statistician testifying based on furnished personnel
records), by listening to testimony in the trial (used primarily as a last-
resort alternative to previously furnished data to contradict the oppo-
nent's expert), or by listening to assumed facts related in the question
(the hypothetical).
This aspect of the direct examination, like all others, should be
managed by the lawyer to maximize the witness' credibility. If the wit-
ness is a real estate appraiser who conducted a thorough examination
of the property, he should be allowed to go into detail in describing the
property. If the witness is a physician testifying for the defense whose
only contact with the plaintiff was a brief physical examination and a
review of the treating physician's records, the direct examiner may
wish to have the witness describe everything he did during the exami-
nation in detail to create the impression of greater involvement in the
case. On the other hand, if the witness is an accountant whose proce-
dures and practices are likely to bore the jury, the lawyer may, after
qualifying him, only ask one or two questions to establish that he did
examine the books in question and then immediately elicit the opinion.
3. Step 3: Establish the basis
This step may be taken either before or after having the witness
state his opinion. In many cases, the expert may be asked his opinion
and then asked, while he has the jury's attention, "Sir, how did you
arrive at that opinion?" The decision rests on such factors as the wit-
ness' personality and the interest or boredom inherent in the subject
matter. In other cases, the lawyer may have the expert describe the
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basis in detail and conclude the direct examination with the opinion,
thereby drawing the examination to a climax. The opinion should al-
ways be the focal point of the direct examination of an expert witness.
The lawyer should force the expert to use ordinary, understanda-
ble words instead of professional jargon. The prepared lawyer will have
become familiar with much of the technical terminology, but he must
remember that the jury is hearing the testimony for the first time, and
will only hear it once. "Collar bone" is just as accurate and much more
generally understood than "clavicle."
4. Step 4: Ask for the opinion
The most important thing for the proponent of expert testimony to
remember is to precisely articulate the question asking for the opinion.
Sometimes the expert opinion is the only thing that will get the plaintiff
past a motion for directed verdict, and it is of utmost importance that
the record reflect an opinion that states the relevant inference that the
lawyer will later urge the jury to draw during her summation. This
entails a knowledge of the substantive law governing the case. In a
medical malpractice case, as an example, the proponent must know
whether the relevant standard of care imposed in that jurisdiction re-
lates to the community in which the alleged malpractice occured or
whether a more general standard of care is applicable. 140 The opinion is
140. An enlightening example of the necessity of knowing exactly what to ask when eliciting
an opinion is afforded by the history of the rule forbidding opinions on the "ultimate issue." These
traditionally were held to invade or usurp the province of the jury. See C. MCCORMICK, supra
note 2, § 12; 7 J. WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 1921. Following a number of cases that had aban-
doned the rule (see People v. Wilson, 25 Cal.2d 341, 153 P.2d 720, (1944); Clifford-Jacobs Forg-
ing Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 19 l.2d 236, 166 N.E.2d 582 (1960); Dowling v. L.H. Shattuck,
Inc., 91 N.H. 234, 17 A.2d 529 (1941); Schweiger v. Solbeck, 191 Or. 454, 230 P.2d 195 (1951)),
FED. & UNIF. R. EviD. 704 specifically jettisoned it: "[T]estimony in the form of an opinion or
inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be
decided by the trier of fact." See Advisory Committee's Note, supra note 131, at 284 (1973).
After John Hinckley, the man who shot President Reagan, was acquitted of a charge of attempted
murder by reason of insanity largely because of the expert testimony of psychiatrists, a public
outcry arose for abolition of the insanity defense. Congress, effective October 12, 1984, amended
FED. R. EvID. 704 to add a Section (b) stating:
No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or condition of a defendant
in a criminal case may state an opinion or inference as to whether the defendant did or
did not have the mental state or condition constituting an element of the crime charged
or of a defense thereto. Such ultimate issue are matters for the trier of fact alone.
No one knows for sure what FED. R. EviD. 704(b) means or what its effect will be. See S.
SALTZBURO, supra note 3, at 267-69 (3d ed. 1985 cumulative supplement). Arkansas has not
adopted any limiting amendment to UNiF. R. EVID. 704. But see Caldwell v. State, 267 Ark. 1053,
594 S.W.2d 24 (1980) (excluding opinion of qualified expert on human perception on basis that it
invaded the province of the jury). The Arkansas Supreme Court has drawn a distinction between
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best elicited by asking two questions similar to the following: (1) Mr.
Expert, have you formed an opinion whether . . . ? (2) What is that
opinion?
VII. WHAT TO DO IF THE WITNESS FORGETS
The law of evidence recognizes that the human memory, like an
automobile battery, is subject to failure and so provides a set of jumper
cables. Counsel can use these jumper cables to connect the witness to
some external power source and recharge the witness' memory battery.
This evidentiary set of jumper cables is the rule allowing use of a writ-
ing or object to refresh the memory of the witness whose power of rec-
ollection is temporarily exhausted. 41
If the witness' memory battery still remains dead after she has
reviewed a writing in an attempt to recharge it, the law allows the writ-
ing itself to be read to the jury, provided certain requirements are met
to ensure its reliability as a substitute for the witness' present recollec-
tion.' This is so although the writing is clearly hearsay. In some cases
when the witness is present and subject to cross-examination, the law
simply classifies her earlier statement as nonhearsay.'4 3
Lack of memory makes a witness as unavailable as physical ab-
sence, and the rules of evidence include lack of memory among the
situations that constitute unavailability. 4 4 If the witness with an un-
rechargeable memory previously testified, and the present opponent had
an opportunity and similar motive to examine, 145 the witness' prior
statement may be admissible as a substitute for the witness' live
testimony. 46
A. The Importance of Preparation
By interviewing witnesses as early as possible in the investigation
opinions that merely embrace an ultimate issue and those that tell the jury which result to reach.
Gramling v. Jennings, 274 Ark. 346, 625 S.W.2d 463 (1981). See also Ethridge v. State, 9 Ark.
App. 111, 654 S.W.2d 595 (1983).
141. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 9, at 18. See also infra § VII(B).
142. FED. & UNIF. R. EVID. 803(5). See infra § VII(C). See also United States v. Massa-
chusetts Maritime Academy, 762 F.2d 142 (1st Cir. 1985).
143. FED. & UNIF. R. EVID. 801(d)(1). See infra § VII(D).
144. FED. & UNIF. R. EVID. 804(a)(3).
145. In a civil case, the opportunity and similar motive to cross-examine may be found in a
predecessor in interest, but in a criminal case the opposing party in the prior hearing or deposition
must have been the same as the opposing party in the present case. FED. & UNIF. R. EVID.
804(b)(1).
146. Id. See infra § VII(E).
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and preparation stages of the lawsuit, the lawyer may obtain state-
ments that can be used to refresh recollection or read as past recollec-
tion recorded in case the witness' memory later falters or fails. If there
is a chance that the witness will become unavailable (by loss of mem-




Writings or objects may be used to refresh a witness' recollection
at two times: before she takes the stand, or while she is testifying. If it
is discovered while preparing the witness to testify that she has forgot-
ten facts she once knew, any writing or object may be used to rekindle
recollection.
149
Unless the court so requires, traditionally there has been no re-
quirement to make available to the opponent a writing used to refresh
the witness' recollection before the witness takes the stand.'5 0 As sub-
mitted to Congress by the Supreme Court, Federal Rule of Evidence
612 required that such documents be made available. As amended by
147. See FED. & UNIF. R. EvID. 804.
148. See generally S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, supra note 3, at 415-19.
149. Other means of refreshing recollection have also been utilized. Among the most intrigu-
ing and troublesome is hypnosis. Courts have taken three approaches to hypnotically induced testi-
mony. Some have allowed it, considering its weight to be a matter for the jury. See. e.g., United
States v. Waksal, 539 F. Supp. 834 (S.D. Fla. 1982), rev'd, 709 F.2d 653 (11th Cir. 1983); Clark
v. State, 379 So. 2d 372 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); State v. Greer, 609 S.W.2d 423 (Mo. App.
1980), vacated, 450 U.S. 1027 (1981); State v. McQueen, 295 N.C. 96, 244 S.E.2d 414 (1978),
overruled, State v. Peoples, 319 S.E.2d 177 (N.C. 1984). Others have allowed it only if certain
safeguards have been followed to minimize the chance that the testimony is the result of sugges-
tion or fantasy rather than true refreshed recollection. See, e.g., United States v. Charles, 561 F.
Supp. 694 (S.D. Tex. 1983); State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981); State v. Beachum,
97 N.M. 682, 643 P.2d 246 (1981); State v. Long, 32 Wash. App. 732, 649 P.2d 845 (1982);
State v. Armstrong, 110 Wis. 2d 555, 329 N.W.2d 386 (1983). Still others have ruled it inadmis-
sible as inherently unreliable. See, e.g., United States v. Valdez, 722 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1984);
Collins v. Superior Ct., 132 Ariz. 180, 644 P.2d 1266 (1982); People v. Shirley, 31 Cal.3d 18, 181
Cal. Rptr. 243, 641 P.2d 775 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 860 (1982); State ex rel Collins v.
State, 52 Md. App. 186, 447 A.2d 1272 (1982); Commonwealth v. Kater, 388 Mass. 519, 447
N.E.2d 1190 (1983); State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1980); People v. Hughes, 59
N.Y.2d 523, 466 N.Y.S. 2d 255, 453 N.E.2d 484 (1983). Arkansas has recently joined the third
group of jurisdictions which exclude hypnotically induced testimony as being inherently unrelia-
ble. Rock v. State, 288 Ark. 566, 708 S.W.2d 78 (1986), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 430 (1986). See
generally C. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 206, at 631-34; Diamond, Inherent Problems in the
Use of Pretrial Hypnosis on a Prospective Witness, 68 CAL. L. REV. 313 (1980); see also
Sprynczynatyk v. General Motors Corp., 771 F.2d 1112 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct.
1263 (1986).
150. Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942); Needleman v. United States, 261 F.2d
802 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 600 (1960).
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Congress and finally adopted, the Rule makes production of writings or
objects used to refresh recollection before the witness takes the stand
discretionary with the judge.' 5 ' The Uniform Rule is in accord with the
Federal Rule.152 The court has discretion to order that any writing or
object so used be made available to the opponent at the trial, hearing
or deposition where the witness is testifying. 53
If the writing or object is used to refresh the recollection of the
witness while testifying, the opponent is always entitled to examine it,
cross-examine the witness about it, and introduce relevant portions of it
into evidence.'"
It should be noted that no hearsay problem exists with items used
to refresh the witness' memory because the writing or object itself is
neither read from nor offered as an exhibit. 55 The witness merely ex-
amines it, is able to remember again, and finally testifies from personal
knowledge without referring to the thing. The proper way to lay the
foundation for use of a writing or object to refresh the witness' memory
when the witness says, "I don't remember," is to ask the witness,
"Would it help refresh your recollection if you were to look at ... ?"
If the witness says, "yes," then counsel can ask to approach, hand the
witness the item that the witness said would refresh her memory, and
ask the witness to examine it. If the witness says "no," the lawyer is
151. FED. R. EvID. 612. See HOUSE COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, FED. RULES OF EVIDENCE.
H.R. REP No. 650, 93d Cong., Ist Sess., p. 13 (1973), reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 1075, 7086. See. e.g., Cosden Oil & Chem. Co. v. Karl 0. Helm Aktiengesellschaft,
736 F.2d 1064 (5th Cir. 1984); James Julian, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 93 F.R.D. 138 (D. Del.
1982). FED. R. EvID. 612 also excepts statements covered by the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500
(1982). The Jencks Act provides, in essence, that pretrial statements of government witnesses
need not be disclosed until after the witness has testified.
152. UNIF. R. EVID. 612. See Goodwin v. State, 263 Ark. 856, 568 S.W.2d 3 (1978).
153. FED. R. EvID. 612 only mentions "hearing" while UNIFORM R. EVID. 612 more specifi-
cally mentions "trial, hearing, or deposition in which the witness is testifying." Battles have been
waged over whether a privileged writing used to refresh recollection may be ordered produced. It
has been held that use of such a document for this purpose constitutes a waiver of the privilege
and that it must be produced. See Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. Underwriters Laboratories,
Inc., 81 F.R.D. 8 (N.D. Il1. 1978). But see Leucadia, Inc. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 101 F.R.D. 674
(S.D.N.Y. 1983).
154. Fed. & Unif. R. Evid. 612(2).
155. A sheriff who had reduced a defendant's oral statement to writing but did not obtain the
defendant's signature on the statement was allowed to use the writing to refresh his own recollec-
tion while testifying. Wilson v. State, 277 Ark. 43, 639 S.W.2d 45 (1982). See also United States
v. Andrade, 788 F.2d 521 (8th Cir. 1986) (use of notes made by another person also present at
interview to refresh was proper); United States v. Scott, 701 F.2d 1340 (11th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 856 (1983); Singleton v. State, 274 Ark. 126, 623 S.W.2d 180 (1981), cert.




out of luck. After the witness has reviewed the document or object, the
lawyer should retrieve it and proceed with the examination. The wit-
ness may not read aloud from a writing used to refresh.' 56
C. Past Recollection Recorded
When a forgetful witness still cannot remember matters he once
knew after having attempted to revive his recollection, the law allows a
memorandum or record made or adopted"5 7 by the witness when the
matter was fresh in his mind to be read into evidence.'" Although the
document is hearsay, it is considered inherently reliable if made while
events were fresh in the witness' memory."' The technique of reading
prior recollection recorded is often useful in examining witnesses who
have made detailed lists or reports based upon personal observation,
but cannot now recall all the details contained in the list or report. 106
Examples are inventory takers and accident investigators.
Since the testimony of the witness, if he could remember, would
have been oral, the document containing past recollection recorded may
only be read to the jury, not introduced as an exhibit.'6 1 This policy
avoids giving the evidence greater weight than it would have had if the
witness had been able to testify from present memory.
The foundation that must be laid' before reading past recollec-
tion recorded to the jury is contained in the rule. '63 Frst, it must be
established that the witness does not have sufficient recollection to en-
able her to testify fully and accurately." Second, it must be estab-
156. See Kalo, Refreshing Recollection: Problems with Laying a Foundation, 10 RUT.-CAM.
L.J. 233 (1979). See also J. TANFORD. supra note 1, at 337.
157. For a criticism of the "adoption" limitation on use of these statements, see S.
SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, supra note 3, at 576-77.
158. FED. & UNIF. R. EVlD. 803(5). These reports and memoranda are, of course, hearsay
and FED. & UNIF. R. EVID. 803(5) is an exception to the hearsay rule. The exception for past
recollection recorded is an old and well-established one. See United States v. Kelly, 349 F.2d 720,
770 (2d Cir. 1965); Annotation, Refreshment of Recollection by Use of Memoranda or Other
Writings, 82 A.L.R.2d 520 (1962); Annotation, Refreshment or Recollection by Use of Memo-
randa or Other Writings. 125 A.L.R. 80 (1940).
159. See Owens v. State, 67 Md. 307, 316, 10 A. 210, 212 (1887).
160. M. GRAHAM, EVIDENCE TEXT, RULES, ILLUSTRATIONS AND PROBLEMS 66 (1983).
161. FED. & UNIF. R. EVlD. 803(5).
162. See United States v. Judon, 567 F.2d 1289, 1294 (5th Cir. 1978) (error to admit memo-
randum as prior recollection recorded without laying proper foundation).
163. FED. & UNIF. R. EvID. 803(5).
164. Id. See In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 756 F.2d 411 (5th Cir. 1985). It
may be forcefully argued that since the rationale for the exception is that the earlier statement is
more than likely accurate (more so, even, than the witness' present testimony), these statements
should be admissible under this exception to the hearsay rule regardless of the witness' ability to
[Vol. 9:255
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lished that the witness once had knowledge of the matter.165 Third, it
must be established that the memorandum or record concerns the mat-
ter in question.1 66 Fourth, the memorandum or record must have been
made or adopted by the witness.167 Fifth, it must have been prepared
when the matter was fresh in the witness' memory.' 68 Sixth, the witness
must state that the document reflects his past knowledge accurately. 169
The exception to the hearsay rule for prior recollection recorded
must be read in conjunction with two other rules of evidence. 70 Rule
801(d)(1) governs admissibility of prior inconsistent statements made
under oath; Rule 804(b)(1) governs admissibility of former testimony
of unavailable witnesses. The drafters could have included the subject
matter of Rule 803(5) in either of these rules, but elected to treat it
separately because the other two situations are more specialized in ap-
plication."' Trial counsel must be aware of the interlocking character
of these three rules so that she can make maximum use of prior, out-of-
court statements of her witnesses.
D. Prior Statements Classified as Nonhearsay
The first rule under which the hearsay exception for prior recollec-
tion recorded could have been included is the rule that excludes prior
statements of a witness from the definition of hearsay under certain
circumstances. 72 If a forgetful witness acknowledges the foundational
elements necessary to read a statement to the jury under the exception
remember. Jordan v. People, 151 Colo. 133, 376 P.2d 699 (1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 944
(1963); Hall v. State, 223 Md. 158, 162 A.2d 751 (1960); State v. Bindhammer, 44 N.J. 372, 209
A.2d 124 (1965). The imposition of the requirement of lack of memory in FED. & UNIF. R. EViD.
803(5) is a policy decision, based upon the drafters' feeling that without the requirement there
might be widespread use of statements carefully prepared before trial for the sole purpose of
introducing them in evidence in place of the witness' live testimony. See Advisory Committee's
Note, supra note 131, at 306.
165. FED. & UNIF. R. EvID. 803(5).
166. Id.
167. Id. The memorandum need not have been prepared personally by the witness, and sev-
eral persons may have been involved in its preparation, so long as it is adopted by the witness. See
Rathbun v. Brancatella, 93 N.J.L. 222, 107 A. 279 (1919).
168. FED. & UNIF. R. EvID. 803(5). Freshness in the witness' memory does not necessarily
mean that the document must have been prepared contemporaneously with the event. See United
States v. Senak, 527 F.2d 129, 141-42 (7th Cir. 1975) (three years after the event). But see
Parliament Ins. Co. v. Hanson, 676 F.2d 1069 (5th Cir. 1982) (exclusion of witness' notes not
made contemporaneous with events at issue, and made in anticipation of litigation).
169. FED. & UNIF. R. EvID. 803(5).
170. FED. & UNIF. R. EvID. 801(d)(1) and 804(b)(1), respectively.
171. See Advisory Committee's Note, supra note 131, at 306.
172. FED. & UNIF. R. EvID. 801(d)(1).
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for prior recollection recorded, the nonhearsay rule is not needed.17 3
However, if the witness denies having made the statement or its accu-
racy, the exception for prior recollection recorded cannot be used. In
this situation, a prior statement of a witness is admissible for substan-
tive purposes174 if the witness is on the stand and subject to cross-exam-
ination, and the statement meets one of the following criteria: It is in-
consistent 17 5 and given under oath in a trial, hearing, proceeding, or
deposition;17 6 it is consistent, but only when used to rebut an attack on
the witness during cross-examination charging recent fabrication, im-
proper influence, or improper motive;1 77 or, it is a statement identifying
a person.
7 8
Two other differences between use of statements classified as
nonhearsay and use of hearsay statements admissible as prior recollec-
tion recorded should be noted. First, the nonhearsay statement must
have been made by the witness himself, and may not be the adopted
statement of another. Second, nonhearsay statements themselves, if ad-
missible, may be made exhibits.
E. Former Testimony of Unavailable Witnesses
Most hearsay exceptions apply whether or not the witness is avail-
able; n79 others apply only if the witness is unavailable. 80 Among the
173. See Advisory Committee's Note, supra note 131, at 293.
174. This is as opposed to being admissible only for the purpose of impeaching the witness'
credibility. The rules for using prior inconsistent statements of witnesses are contained in FED. &
UNIF. R. EvID. 613. Whether the prior statement of a witness is admissible for the truth of the
matters asserted therein or merely for impeachment purposes can make the difference between
whether a prosecutor survives a motion for directed verdict. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149
(1970). The constitutional issue whether or under what circumstances use of prior out-of-court
statements of witnesses by prosecutors may violate the confrontation clause is beyond the scope of
this article. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. For the United States Supreme Court's most recent
pronouncement on the confrontation issue, see Lee v. Illinois, 106 S. Ct. 2056 (1986).
175. See Perroni, Impeachment of One's Own Witness by Prior Inconsistent Statements
Under the Federal and Arkansas Rules of Evidence. 1 UALR L.J. 277 (1978).
176. FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(l)(A). In Arkansas, prior inconsistent statements of witnesses are
admissible for substantive purposes in civil cases even if not made under oath. ARK. UNIF. R.
EVID. 801(d)(1)(i). Hawthorne v. Davis, 268 Ark. 131, 594 S.W.2d 844 (1980); Slavens v. State,
1 Ark. App. 245, 614 S.W.2d 529 (1981).
177. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(l)(B); ARK. UNIF. R. EvID. 801(d)(1)(ii); Todd v. State, 283 Ark.
492, 678 S.W.2d 345 (1984). The statement must antedate the motive to fabricate. See George v.
State, 270 Ark. 335, 604 S.W.2d 940 (1980). See also United States v. Blankinship, 784 F.2d 317
(8th Cir. 1986); United States v. Hernandez, 779 F.2d 456 (8th Cir. 1985).
178. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(I)(C); ARK. UNIV. R. EvID. 801(d)(I)(iii).
179. FED. & UNIF. R. EvID. 803.
180. FED. & UNIF. R. EVID. 804.
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situations that constitute unavailability'6 ' is the one in which the wit-
ness "testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of his state-
ment."'182 Therefore, when a witness says he cannot remember, the
hearsay exceptions based on unavailability may be utilized by the ex-
aminer. One such exception makes the former testimony of the witness
admissible, but only if the party against whom the testimony is now
offered (or in civil actions a predecessor in interest) had both the op-
portunity and a similar motive to examine the witness in the former
proceeding or deposition. 188
At first blush, it would seem that if forgetfulness renders a witness
unavailable, there would be no need to have both this exception al-
lowing former testimony of the witness to be introduced and the excep-
tion allowing use of prior recollection recorded regardless of the wit-
ness' availability. The exception for prior recollection recorded could
have been included here. However, the drafters of the rules perceived a
difference in the concepts of unavailability in the two rules and elected
to treat the exceptions for prior recollection recorded and for former
testimony separately.'"
The foundation requirements for the former testimony exception
are different from those for the prior recollection recorded exception.
The witness must first testify to a lack of memory.' 86 Second, it must
be shown that the party against whom the testimony is now offered had
an opportunity to examine the witness in the former proceeding.' 8
Since only parties have the right to examine witnesses, this means that
the earlier proceeding must either have been in the present action, or
that the present opponent was a party in the former proceeding. 87 Fi-
181. The other situations are: Exemption by the court because of a privilege; refusal to tes-
tify despite a court order to do so; death; physical or mental illness or infirmity; absence if the
proponent shows inability to procure his presence despite process or other reasonable means. FED.
& UNIF. R. EVID. 804(A). See Lewis v. State, 288 Ark. 595, 709 S.W.2d 56 (1986).
182. FED. & UNIF. R. EViD. 804(a)(3).
183. FED. & UNIF. R. EVID. 804(b)(1). See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970). Ar-
kansas takes a narrower view of the former testimony exception, holding that preliminary hearings
do not afford sufficient opportunity or motive for cross-examination to make testimony given there
admissible under this rule. Scott v. State, 272 Ark. 88, 612 S.W.2d 110 (1981). There is a statu-
tory procedure in Arkansas whereby the state, after giving notice to a defendant, can take evi-
dence to be preserved for trial. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-626 (1977).
184. See Advisory Committee's Note, supra note 131, at 306.
185. FED. & UNIF. R. EvlD. 804(a)(3).
186. FED. & UNIF. R. EVID. 804(b)(1).
187. In Bolden v. Carter, 269 Ark. 391, 602 S.W.2d 640 (1980), the plaintiff, a police of-
ficer, sued to recover for personal injuries resulting from an alleged assault and battery. The
defendant had been stopped by the plaintiff for a traffic violation and gave the plaintiff a broken
jaw and ribs rather than receive a traffic citation. The defendant sought to introduce the former
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nally, there must have been a similar motive to examine the witness
concerning the matter. 188 This requires similarity of issues, and may be
defeated if the party offering the testimony in the present trial is not
the party who offered it in the former proceeding.' 8 '
CONCLUSION
The most skilled carpenter cannot construct a building without a
hammer. Try as he might he cannot drive the nails with his bare hand.
Without a hammer, the boards cannot be connected. With a hammer,
though, he is able to join the raw materials together into a unified
whole.
The hammer, however, is a mere inanimate object, completely in-
effectual until used by a person who knows how to drive a nail. A ham-
mer in the hand of one who does not know how to use it is of no value
at all. Although he may be able to describe the hammer in minute
detail, unless he can drive a nail with it, his knowledge of the hammer
is impotent. It is one thing to describe a hammer; it is quite another to
drive a nail.
The law of evidence is the lawyer's hammer. It is the tool that
enables him to nail together the raw materials of his client's case. But
like the hammer, the law of evidence is of no avail to the lawyer who
does not know how to use it as a tool. Mere academic familiarity with
the law of evidence is useless unless the lawyer has the dexterity to
employ it in the courtroom as an instrument with which to combine the
disparate elements of his case into a comprehensible structure.
The lawyer has many things to consider when planning and exe-
cuting the direct examination of witnesses. Many of the considerations
are practical-where to stand, how to sequence the questions, the order
of the witnesses, whether to allow a witness to narrate. However, all of
these practical decisions, even if made correctly, are for naught if the
lawyer is unable to get his client's case before the jury because he does
not understand the law of evidence.
The lawyer who can combine these two necessary ingredients of
testimony of three character witnesses who had testified on his behalf at the trials of the criminal
charge resulting from the incident (both of which resulted in convictions, but both of which were
reversed). The witnesses had become unavailable since the criminal trials. Since the plaintiff po-
lice officer had not been a party in the criminal case and had no right to examine the witnesses in
that proceeding, and since the state was not the plaintiff's predecessor in interest, the testimony
was not allowed.
188. FED. & UNIF. R. EVID. 804(b)(1).
189. See Advisory Committee's Note, supra note 131, at 323; California v. Green, 399 U.S.
149 (1970).
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successful direct examination, knowledge of evidence and practical
skill, will emerge victorious more often and can always rest secure in
the knowledge that he has represented his client well. His colleagues
will admire him and the judges before whom he appears will respect
him.

